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- SK IMT㈜ 회사개요 및 향후 사업추진 계획(전문)
- ◇SK IMT 회사개요 및 향후 사업추진 계획
1.회사개요
o 회 사 명: SK IMT㈜
o 대표이사: 강 용 수
o 자기자본: 1조6,000억원
※ 설립자본금 : 3,000억원, 주식초과발행금 : 1조 3,000억원(출연금)
o 직 원 수 : 50여명(설립 초기)
o 이사회 구성
o 주주 구성
- 대주주 : SK 텔레콤
- 주요주주 : 포항제철, 신세기통신
- 전략주주 및 일반주주 : 파워콤, KBS, SBS, 흥창, 다우기술, 지오인터랙티브 등 670여개사
2.향후 사업추진 계획
o 사업추진 방향
o 고품질의 다양한 멀티미디어 서비스를 저렴한 요금으로 제공
- 실시간 동영상 전송기술과 위치 추적, 음성인식 등의 첨단기술을 이용한 다양한 멀티미디어 서비스를 서비스 초기부터 제공
- SK텔레콤을 비롯하여 주주사로 참여한 신세기통신, 파워콤 등의 통신 인프라와 주주사의 유통망 및 보유자원을 최대한 활용하여 중복투자 방지와 원가절감
o 정보통신산업 발전 및 국민경제에의 기여
- 비동기식 IMT-2000 상용장비 및 단말기의 개발을 위해 100여개의 업체에 협력하여 공급계약을 체결하여 안정적 생산활동 보장하는 한편, 장비공급업체와의 해외 동반진출 도모
- 컨텐츠 및 소프트웨어분야 협력업체에 총 700여억원 지원 및 컨텐츠 지원 센터 건립, 인센티브 제공 등으로 컨텐츠 산업 육성
o 법인설립
- 2001. 3월 9일 : 법인설립
- 2001. 3월 20일 : 출연금 납부 및 사업허가 신청
o 증자계획
h 법인 설립시 SK IMT자기자본은 1조6,000억원으로 이는 설립 자본금
3,000억원과 주식초과발행금 1조 3,000억원(출연금)으로 구성
h 2002~2004년동안 유상증자시 마다 유상증자 물량의 3%를 일반개인 주주에 공모배정
o 서비스 제공시기
2002년 상용서비스 제공 목표
o 서비스 제공계획
o SK텔레콤은 비동기 방식의 장점인 글로벌 로밍의 조기 활성화를 위해 일본, 중국의 제1사업자인 NTT DoCoMo, China Mobile과의 상호협력을 통하여, 우선적으로 동북아 단일 통화권을 구축하고, 이를 유럽, 미국, 동남아 국가들로 로밍 지역을 확산시킴으로써 언제 어디서나 이용 가능한 서비스의 꿈을 실현해 나갈 것임.
o 멀티미디어 컨텐츠 기반의 다양하고 차별화된 서비스를 서비스 개시부터 제공
- 주요 서비스 : 영상전화, 채팅, 동영상 방송 서비스, 전자상거래서비스, 고속인터넷 접속, 멀티미디어 네트워크 게임, 원격교육 등
o 가상사설망 등 부가서비스 49종, All IP 응용서비스 등 신규서비스 10종 제공
o 누적가입자수 및 매출 예측
o 국내 IMT-2000서비스의 가입자는 2007년 약1,700만명으로 예측됨.
o SK IMT의 점유율은 사업초기에는 전체가입자수의 46.4%로 예상되며, 2007년 초에는 47.8%로 예상
o 매출액의 경우 2007년초 약 1조7,000억원에 달할 것임.
o 시설투자 및 연구개발계획
o SK IMT는 전국망 구축을 위해 1조2,500억원을 투자하고, 가입자 증가에 따른 망 증설 등에 1조2,000억원, 망 고도화 및 품질개선에 8,200억원을 투자하여 2007년까지 총 3조 2,900억원을 투자
o SK텔레콤은 ‘99년도부터 대기업 및 중소&382;벤처기업과 시스템 및 서비스개발을 위해 5개 분야로 구분하여 약 90개 업체에 1,233억원을 투자 개발 중에 있으며, SK IMT는 상용시스템을 적기에 개발하고 미래 핵심기술을 조기에 확보하기 매출액 대비 연평균 10% 이상을 연구개발에 투자할 계획
o 자금조달계획
o SK IMT는 2007년까지 시설투자를 비롯하여 영업비용 등 사업전반에 소요될 것으로 예상되는 약 13조원의 자금을 영업활동을 통해 9조원, 재무활동을 통해 3조원, 기타 자금유입 등으로 조달할 계획
o 유상증자 및 회사채를 통한 자금조달 비중을 높이고, 은행을 통한 단기차입을 최소화하여 재무안정성을 확보할 것임.
- 앨런 그린스펀 FRB 의장 하원증언 전문(영문)
- Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan
Federal Reserve Board semiannual monetary policy report to the Congress
Before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives
February 28, 2001
This presentation updates the testimony given by Chairman Greenspan before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, on February 13, 2001
I appreciate the opportunity this morning to present the Federal Reserve"s semiannual report on monetary policy.
The past decade has been extraordinary for the American economy and monetary policy. The synergies of key technologies markedly elevated prospective rates of return on high-tech investments, led to a surge in business capital spending, and significantly increased the underlying growth rate of productivity. The capitalization of those higher expected returns boosted equity prices, contributing to a substantial pickup in household spending on new homes, durable goods, and other types of consumption generally, beyond even that implied by the enhanced rise in real incomes.
When I last reported to you in July, economic growth was just exhibiting initial signs of slowing from what had been an exceptionally rapid and unsustainable rate of increase that began a year earlier.
The surge in spending had lifted the growth of the stocks of many types of consumer durable goods and business capital equipment to rates that could not be continued. The elevated level of light vehicle sales, for example, implied a rate of increase in the number of vehicles on the road hardly sustainable for a mature industry. And even though demand for a number of high-tech products was doubling or tripling annually, in many cases new supply was coming on even faster. Overall, capacity in high-tech manufacturing industries rose nearly 50 percent last year, well in excess of its rapid rate of increase over the previous three years. Hence, a temporary glut in these industries and falling prospective rates of return were inevitable at some point. Clearly, some slowing in the pace of spending was necessary and expected if the economy was to progress along a balanced and sustainable growth path.
But the adjustment has occurred much faster than most businesses anticipated, with the process likely intensified by the rise in the cost of energy that has drained business and household purchasing power. Purchases of durable goods and investment in capital equipment declined in the fourth quarter. Because the extent of the slowdown was not anticipated by businesses, it induced some backup in inventories, despite the more advanced just-in-time technologies that have in recent years enabled firms to adjust production levels more rapidly to changes in demand. Inventory-sales ratios rose only moderately; but relative to the levels of these ratios implied by their downtrend over the past decade, the emerging imbalances appeared considerably larger. Reflecting these growing imbalances, manufacturing purchasing managers reported last month that inventories in the hands of their customers had risen to excessively high levels.
As a result, a round of inventory rebalancing appears to be in progress. Accordingly, the slowdown in the economy that began in the middle of 2000 intensified, perhaps even to the point of growth stalling out around the turn of the year. As the economy slowed, equity prices fell, especially in the high-tech sector, where previous high valuations and optimistic forecasts were being reevaluated, resulting in significant losses for some investors. In addition, lenders turned more cautious. This tightening of financial conditions, itself, contributed to restraint on spending.
Against this background, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) undertook a series of aggressive monetary policy steps. At its December meeting, the FOMC shifted its announced assessment of the balance of risks to express concern about economic weakness, which encouraged declines in market interest rates. Then on January 3, and again on January 31, the FOMC reduced its targeted federal funds rate 1/2 percentage point, to its current level of 5-1/2 percent. An essential precondition for this type of response was that underlying cost and price pressures remained subdued, so that our front-loaded actions were unlikely to jeopardize the stable, low inflation environment necessary to foster investment and advances in productivity.
With signs of softness still patently in evidence at the time of its January meeting, the FOMC retained its sense that downside risks predominate. The exceptional degree of slowing so evident toward the end of last year (perhaps in part the consequence of adverse weather) seemed less evident in January and February. Nonetheless, the economy appears to be on a track well below the productivity-enhanced rate of growth of its potential and, even after the policy actions we took in January, the risks continue skewed toward the economy"s remaining on a path inconsistent with satisfactory economic performance.
Crucial to the assessment of the outlook and the understanding of recent policy actions is the role of technological change and productivity in shaping near-term cyclical forces as well as long-term sustainable growth.
The prospects for sustaining strong advances in productivity in the years ahead remain favorable. As one would expect, productivity growth has slowed along with the economy. But what is notable is that, during the second half of 2000, output per hour advanced at a pace sufficiently impressive to provide strong support for the view that the rate of growth of structural productivity remains well above its pace of a decade ago.
Moreover, although recent short-term business profits have softened considerably, most corporate managers appear not to have altered to any appreciable extent their long-standing optimism about the future returns from using new technology. A recent survey of purchasing managers suggests that the wave of new on-line business-to-business activities is far from cresting. Corporate managers more generally, rightly or wrongly, appear to remain remarkably sanguine about the potential for innovations to continue to enhance productivity and profits. At least this is what is gleaned from the projections of equity analysts, who, one must presume, obtain most of their insights from corporate managers. According to one prominent survey, the three- to five-year average earnings projections of more than a thousand analysts, though exhibiting some signs of diminishing in recent months, have generally held at a very high level. Such expectations, should they persist, bode well for continued strength in capital accumulation and sustained elevated growth of structural productivity over the longer term.
The same forces that have been boosting growth in structural productivity seem also to have accelerated the process of cyclical adjustment. Extraordinary improvements in business-to-business communication have held unit costs in check, in part by greatly speeding up the flow of information. New technologies for supply-chain management and flexible manufacturing imply that businesses can perceive imbalances in inventories at a very early stage--virtually in real time--and can cut production promptly in response to the developing signs of unintended inventory building.
Our most recent experience with some inventory backup, of course, suggests that surprises can still occur and that this process is still evolving. Nonetheless, compared with the past, much progress is evident. A couple of decades ago, inventory data would not have been available to most firms until weeks had elapsed, delaying a response and, hence, eventually requiring even deeper cuts in production. In addition, the foreshortening of lead times on delivery of capital equipment, a result of information and other newer technologies, has engendered a more rapid adjustment of capital goods production to shifts in demand that result from changes in firms" expectations of sales and profitability. A decade ago, extended backlogs on capital equipment meant a more stretched-out process of production adjustments.
Even consumer spending decisions have become increasingly responsive to changes in the perceived profitability of firms through their effects on the value of households" holdings of equities. Stock market wealth has risen substantially relative to income in recent years--itself a reflection of the extraordinary surge of innovation. As a consequence, changes in stock market wealth have become a more important determinant of shifts in consumer spending relative to changes in current household income than was the case just five to seven years ago.
The hastening of the adjustment to emerging imbalances is generally beneficial. It means that those imbalances are not allowed to build until they require very large corrections. But the faster adjustment process does raise some warning flags. Although the newer technologies have clearly allowed firms to make more informed decisions, business managers throughout the economy also are likely responding to much of the same enhanced body of information. As a consequence, firms appear to be acting in far closer alignment with one another than in decades past. The result is not only a faster adjustment, but one that is potentially more synchronized, compressing changes into an even shorter time frame.
This very rapidity with which the current adjustment is proceeding raises another concern, of a different nature. While technology has quickened production adjustments, human nature remains unaltered. We respond to a heightened pace of change and its associated uncertainty in the same way we always have. We withdraw from action, postpone decisions, and generally hunker down until a renewed, more comprehensible basis for acting emerges. In its extreme manifestation, many economic decisionmakers not only become risk averse but attempt to disengage from all risk. This precludes taking any initiative, because risk is inherent in every action. In the fall of 1998, for example, the desire for liquidity became so intense that financial markets seized up. Indeed, investors even tended to shun risk-free, previously issued Treasury securities in favor of highly liquid, recently issued Treasury securities.
But even when decisionmakers are only somewhat more risk averse, a process of retrenchment can occur. Thus, although prospective long-term returns on new high-tech investment may change little, increased uncertainty can induce a higher discount of those returns and, hence, a reduced willingness to commit liquid resources to illiquid fixed investments.
Such a process presumably is now under way and arguably may take some time to run its course. It is not that underlying demand for Internet, networking, and communications services has become less keen. Instead, as I noted earlier, some suppliers seem to have reacted late to accelerating demand, have overcompensated in response, and then have been forced to retrench--a not-unusual occurrence in business decisionmaking.
A pace of change outstripping the ability of people to adjust is just as evident among consumers as among business decisionmakers. When consumers become less secure in their jobs and finances, they retrench as well.
It is difficult for economic policy to deal with the abruptness of a break in confidence. There may not be a seamless transition from high to moderate to low confidence on the part of businesses, investors, and consumers. Looking back at recent cyclical episodes, we see that the change in attitudes has often been sudden. In earlier testimony, I likened this process to water backing up against a dam that is finally breached. The torrent carries with it most remnants of certainty and euphoria that built up in earlier periods.
This unpredictable rending of confidence is one reason that recessions are so difficult to forecast. They may not be just changes in degree from a period of economic expansion, but a different process engendered by fear. Our economic models have never been particularly successful in capturing a process driven in large part by nonrational behavior.
For this reason, changes in consumer confidence will require close scrutiny in the period ahead, especially after the steep falloff of recent months. But for now, at least, the weakness in sales of motor vehicles and homes has been modest, suggesting that consumers have retained enough confidence to make longer-term commitments; and, as I pointed out earlier, expected earnings growth over the longer-run continues to be elevated. Obviously, if the forces contributing to long-term productivity growth remain intact, the degree of retrenchment will presumably be limited. In that event, prospects for high productivity growth should, with time, bolster both consumption and investment demand. Before long in this scenario, excess inventories would be run off to desired levels. Higher demand should also facilitate the working-off of a presumed excess capital stock, though, doubtless, at a more modest pace.
Still, as the FOMC noted in its last announcement, for the period ahead, downside risks predominate. In addition to the possibility of a break in confidence, we don"t know how far the adjustment of the stocks of consumer durables and business capital equipment has come. Also, foreign economies appear to be slowing, which could damp demands for exports; and continued nervousness is evident in the behavior of participants in financial markets, keeping risk spreads relatively elevated.
Because the advanced supply-chain management and flexible manufacturing technologies may have quickened the pace of adjustment in production and incomes and correspondingly increased the stress on confidence, the Federal Reserve has seen the need to respond more aggressively than had been our wont in earlier decades. Economic policymaking could not, and should not, remain unaltered in the face of major changes in the speed of economic processes. Fortunately, the very advances in technology that have quickened economic adjustments have also enhanced our capacity for real-time surveillance.
As I pointed out earlier, demand has been depressed by the rise in energy prices as well as by the needed slowing in the pace of accumulation of business capital and consumer durable assets. The sharp rise in energy costs pressed down on profit margins still further in the fourth quarter. About a quarter of the rise in total unit costs of nonfinancial, nonenergy corporations reflected a rise in energy costs. The 12 percent rise in natural gas prices last quarter contributed directly, and indirectly through its effects on the cost of electrical power generation, about one-fourth of the rise in overall energy costs for nonfinancial, non-energy corporations; increases in oil prices accounted for the remainder.
In addition, a significant part of the margin squeeze not directly attributable to higher energy costs probably has reflected the effects of the moderation in consumer outlays that, in turn, has been due in part to higher costs of energy, especially for natural gas. Hence, it is likely that energy cost increases contributed significantly more to the deteriorating profitability of nonfinancial, non-energy corporations in the fourth quarter than is suggested by the energy-related rise in total unit costs alone.
To be sure, the higher energy expenses of households and most businesses represent a transfer of income to producers of energy. But the capital investment of domestic energy producers, and, very likely, consumption by their owners, have provided only a small offset to the constraining effects of higher energy costs on spending by most Americans. Moreover, a significant part of the extra expense is sent overseas to foreign energy producers, whose demand for exports from the United States is unlikely to rise enough to compensate for the reduction in domestic spending, especially in the short-run. Thus, given the evident inability of energy users, constrained by intense competition for their own products, to pass on much of their cost increases, the rise in energy costs does not appear to have had broad inflationary effects, in contrast to some previous episodes when inflation expectations were not as well anchored. Rather, the most prominent effects have been to depress aggregate demand. The recent decline in energy prices and further declines anticipated by futures markets, should they occur, would tend to boost purchasing power and be an important factor supporting a recovery in demand growth over coming quarters.
In summary, then, although the sources of long-term strength of our economy remain in place, excesses built up in 1999 and early 2000 have engendered a retrenchment that has yet to run its full course. This retrenchment has been prompt, in part because new technologies have enabled businesses to respond more rapidly to emerging excesses. Accordingly, to foster financial conditions conducive to the economy"s realizing its long-term strengths, the Federal Reserve has quickened the pace of adjustment of its policy.
February 2001 Monetary Policy Report
- CEO 연찬회 발표 요지⑥- 이재형 액션츄어 대표
- 이재형 액션츄어 대표이사
。 금융개혁 및 기업구조조정의 궁극적 목표는 기업 및 금융기관의 제고에 있음. 경쟁력 제고의 핵심은 순부가가치 중심의 경영과 이를 달성할 수 있는 내부역량의 확보에 있음.
。 그동안 기업부문 및 금융부문에 대한 정부의 일괄적인 개혁방향은 합병, 회사정리, 금융지주회사 제도 도입 등 다양한 구조조정 수단을 활용하여 각 산업 및 금융부문의 재무구조, 그리고 하드웨어 및 인프라를 개선하는데 주력해왔음.
。 이러한 정부 주도형의 일괄(once and for all) 구조조정 방식은 구조조정 진행과정에서의 투명성, 공적자금의 활용, 선택적 지원에 대한 공평성 등 논란이 있을 수 있지만, 금융 및 기업무문의 경쟁력 제고를 위한 기본원칙을 수립하고 변화의 필요성에 대한 국민전체의 공동인식을 가져올 수 있었다는 점은 긍정적으로 평가할 수 있음.
。 향후 하드웨어와 부분적인 소프트웨어의 개혁을 더욱 성공적으로 마무리하기 위한 금융개혁과 기업구조조정 이후의 우리 경제가 해결해야 될 과제는 기업 및 금융기관 전반에 걸친 효율화와 순부가가치 창출을 위한 내부적인 혁신을 지속적으로, 그리고 장기적으로 추진함으로써 글로벌 경쟁에서 생존할 수 있는 "글로벌 기업"으로 재도약하는 것이라고 할 수 있음.
。 기업부문의 경우,
-효과적인 경영 감시활동의 보장
-기술적 기반을 활용한 비효율 경영부문의 개선
-고객 순부가가치의 극대화를 위한 마케팅 부문의 효율화
-글로벌 기업으로서의 재도약
-기업문화 측면에서의 기업역할을 재조명하는 자세
。 금융부문의 경우,
-전문화되고 차별화된 경영
-내부 경영프로세스의 지속적 개선
-제휴모델(consolidator)의 성공적 이행
-종합 금융자문업 관련 투자와 판매채널, 영업부문의 개선
-금융기관의 위험관리 프로세스의 선진화 지속
-저금리하의 금융기관 경영전략 및 상품개발의 필요성
- 안나쿠르니코바 제작자, 바이러스 피해 "사과"
- VBS/VBSWG.J 바이러스, 일명 안나쿠르니코바 바이러스의 제작자 "온더플라이(OnTheFly)"가 제작 동기와 방법을 공개하고 바이러스 전파에 따른 피해에 대해 사과했다. 안철수연구소가 14일 IT잡지 "와이어드"에 게재된 사과문을 전한데 따르면 그는 거의 모든 시간을 인터넷 검색으로 보내며, 우연히 러브레터 바이러스의 파급 효과에 대한 기사를 읽은 후 제작을 결심했다고 밝히고 있다.
그는 프로그램 언어를 전혀 모르나 공개돼 있는 비주얼 베이직 툴 킷을 이용해 이를 제작했으며, 사용자들에게 피해를 주고 싶은 의도는 전혀 없었다며 예상하지 못한 결과에 당황하고 있는 것으로 알려졌다.
사과문은 "http://members.tripodnet.nl/on_the_fly/index.html"에서 확인할 수 있다.
다음은 사과문 전문이다.
Welcome to OnTheFly!
After receiving several e-mails from news-papers and news-channels I decided to
write this letter.
The Netherlands, 13 februari 2001
Dear Sir/Madam,
I admit writing the virus.
In this letter I"d like you to know that I didn"t do it for fun.
Let me first tell you how I made this.
As I have been reading on the internet all the time,
I have made this virus with a Visual Basic Worm Generator,
written by [K]Alamar. K. is NOT involved with this worm!
I have been using this programm because I don"t know any programming languages.
About the targets
Anna Kournikova:
Just because I am a big fan of her.
She deserves some attention, doesn"t she??
www.DynaByte.nl: Just because I needed a site.
A couple of days ago I bought something in that Dutch Ccomputershop
and at the moment of writing that virus I had the receipt in front of me, on my
desk.
I never meant to harm the site (tell me if I did).
That"s why I put the 29th of januari as the date of downloading the site.
I"m sure that the VBS/OnTheFly.a-virus is already stopped by then..
Some reasons
Ok. This is the most important part of this &48206;ress-letter?
Last week I read an artikle about some research (www.idc.com) about the impact
of the LoveLetter-virus.
The title of that artikle says enough: IDC: internetters hebben niets geleerd
van I Love You
(wich means in English: Surfing people haven"t learned anything from the I Love
You-virus)
I think IDC is right. I also think that you agree with me, according to the rate
of spreading?
Maybe this is also Anna"s blame, she is so pretty..J
Last thing I"d like to say is that I never wanted to harm the people you opened
the attachment.
But after all: it"s their own fault they got infected with the AnnaKournikova
virus,
OnTheFly virus or watever they call it.
To get rid of that virus, please visit the regular anti-virus sites.
They all have some antdote right now.
Sincerely,
OnTheFly
The Netherlands
- 다산인터네트, 네트워크장비 9종 개발..내일 시연회
- 네트웍 장비 전문회사인 다산인터네트는 ATM 라우터 2종, xDSL 라우터, VoIP 라우터 2종, VoIP 게이트웨이 3종, 통합 DSLAM 장비 등 총 9종을 동시 개발했다고 5일 밝혔다. 다산인터네트는 또 오는 6일 대치동 코스모스타워 본사 3층 대강당에서 "다산 Kick-off 2001행사"를 열고 새로 개발된 장비에 대한 시연회를 가진다.
다산은 이번 장비들의 개발을 통해 네트워크 범용 장비 뿐만 아니라 ATM 라우터, VoIP 라우터, VoIP gateway, 통합 DSLAM 등의 고부가 시장에서도 외국산 제품과 경쟁 할 수 있는 체제를 갖추게 됐다고 설명했다.
다산인터네트가 자체기술로 개발한 ATM 라우터인 버텍스(VERTEX) 2501A은 학내망이나 관공서의 초고속 국가망에 접속할 수 있는 소형 ATM 접속라우터이다. 또 버텍스 3800은 155M의 초고속 중형 라우터로 그동안 전량 외산에 의존해 오던 고가의 중형 네트워크 장비인데 이번에 국산화했다.
현재 급성장하고 있는 VoIP 시장에 대응하여 다산인터네트는 소형,중형,대형의 VoIP 게이트웨이(모델명 ACCESS-GATEWAY 08,90,360V)를 출시했다. 특히 그 동안 영국이나 미국에서 전량에 수입에 의존하던 중형 및 대형의 VoIP 게이트웨이를 국산화해 UMS 서비스 업자, VoIP 사업자에게 가격과 성능면에서 뛰어난 장비를 공급할 수 있게 됐다는 설명이다.
VoIP 라우터 2종(VERTEX 3840-VoIP08, VERTEX 3840-VoIP90)은 VoIP 게이트웨이를 내장한 라우터로 기존에는 라우터와 VoIP게이트웨이를 따로 구입해 사용하는데 비해 단일 라우터 플랫폼에서 VoIP 기능을 제공해 사용자가 비용절감을 할 수 있다.
다산 관계자는 "획기적인 제품으로 주목 받고 있는 통합 DSALM 장비인 ACCESS-ALL은 ADSL, SDSL, VDSL과 LAN(근거리 통신망), POTS(전화망) 등의 다양한 가입자 인터페이스를 수용하는 새로운 개념의 제품"이라며 "시스템의 뛰어난 수용용량으로 여러 서비스 사업자나 기간통신 사업자에게 저비용 고효율의 인터넷 가입자 서비스 시스템으로 사용 가능하다"고 설명했다.
다산은 다음달 이번 모델에 각종 부가 기능을 덧붙인 버전 2 모델도 출시할 예정이다.
남민우 사장은 "지난해 라우터, 스위치 등 네트워크 장비 1차 Line-up을 마치고 금년에는 보다 고부가 서비스가 가능한 다양한 영역에서도 외국산 제품과 경쟁할 수 있는 체제를 갖추었다"며 "올해에는 이들 신제품 뿐만 아니라 지난해 개발된 중형 및 대형 라우터를 통해 1000억원의 매출과 200억원의 이익을 실현하겠다"고 밝혔다.
◇용어설명
-ATM : Asynchronous Transfer Mode - 비동기 전송 모드. 데이터, 음성과 화상 트래픽을 통합할 수 있는 차세대 기술로 널리 알려져 있다. 전송할 정보가 있을 때만 정보 데이터를 53바이트의 일정한 크기로 분할해 프레임에 실어 전송한다. 광대역 종합 정보통신망(B-ISDN)이 실현됐을 때 가장 유리하게 적용될 수 있는 방식으로 인식된다.
- VoIP : Voice Over Internet Protocol
- Gateway : 서로 구조가 다른 두개의 통신 네트워크를 연결하는 데 쓰이는 장치
-xDSL : Digital Subscriber Line - 디지털 가입자 접속. 가입자 선로 고도화를 위한 새로운 기술로 디지털 가입자 회선 또는 멀티 DSL로도 불린다. 통신업체가 대규모의 고속 인터넷 접속 시장의 수요를 충족시키기 위햐 추진하고 있는 고속모뎀 기술로, ADSL, HDSL, SDSL, VDSL 등 여러 종류의 기술을 포함한다.
기존의 구리선을 이용해 제한된 거리에서 광대역 폭을 지원하는 공중망 기술이다. 대부분의 DSL 기술은 트위스트 페어의 대역폭을 모두 사용하지 않기 때문에 음성 채널도 같이 사용할 수 있다.
예를 들어 ASDS 모뎀으로 인터넷을 여행하면서 동일한 회선으로 전화를 걸고 받을 수 있다. 설치하기도 어렵고 고가인 광케이블이 아닌 이미 전 세계 어디나 설치되어 있는 전화선을 이용한다는 점에서 훨씬 경제적으로 빠른 시일 내에 사용자에게 초고속 정보통신의 매력을 느끼게 할 수 있다는 점에서 주목받고 있다,
- IMF 발표문 전문
- On January 31, 2001, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Korea.1
Background
Korea"s three-year standby arrangement with the IMF expired on December 3, 2000. Substantial progress was made during the program. First, macroeconomic fundamentals have improved sharply, and Korea"s economy has become more resilient to external shocks. Second, a wide range of structural reforms have made the economy more open, competitive, and market driven. Despite these accomplishments, both domestic and foreign sentiment about Korea have deteriorated in recent months. The decline in confidence is largely related to the perception of a lack of tangible results in corporate and financial sector restructuring, combined with a worsening of the external environment.
In 2000, full-year growth is estimated to have been around 9½ percent, with continuing healthy growth in domestic demand and a substantial contribution from net exports. Unemployment continued to fall, averaging 4.0 percent in 2000. Supply shocks and higher public service charges pushed up headline CPI inflation to 2¼ percent, but average core inflation remained well within the Bank of Korea"s target of 2.5 ± 1 percent. The external position remained healthy. Higher oil prices and strong import demand were offset by booming export volumes and steady prices for most exports. The current account surplus is estimated to have been $10½ billion (2¼ percent of GDP) in 2000, down from $25 billion (6 percent of GDP) in 1999.
Fiscal consolidation in 2000 proceeded much more rapidly than expected, with the consolidated central government balance switching from a deficit of 3.8 percent of GDP in 1999 to a surplus of around 1 percent of GDP in 2000 (under comparable definitions). The overnight call rate, after being increased twice in 2000, has been kept steady since October, at 5¼ percent.
The economy"s rapid expansion has slowed substantially in recent months due to a less favorable external environment and weaker consumer confidence. Over the medium term, growth is projected to settle at about 6 percent, in line with potential output growth. Achieving this growth rate depends critically on further progress in implementing structural reforms.
Substantial progress has been made in stabilizing the financial system, addressing corporate distress, strengthening the institutional framework for corporate governance and financial supervision, liberalizing capital markets and foreign investment, fostering transparency, and enhancing the role of market discipline. The institutional framework for restructuring is largely in place and major strides have been made in addressing the deep-seated problems of enterprises and financial institutions. However, several structural weaknesses remain, which have dented market confidence.
In the corporate sector, financial disclosure and corporate governance are improving. Some corporate divestitures and other operational restructuring have occurred, notably by less-distressed chaebol acting voluntarily outside formal workout programs. The ability of creditors to force a number of large chaebol into receivership and to take control of Daewoo should help deter imprudent corporate investments in the future. Nevertheless, Korea"s corporate sector remains highly leveraged and continues to suffer from low profitability. The ongoing liquidity pressures in the corporate bond market are a further sign of the need for corporate restructuring.
Significant steps have been taken to strengthen the financial system, and the problems that remain largely stem from continuing weaknesses in the corporate sector. Progress has been most notable in consolidating and recapitalizing the banking system, operational restructuring, and strengthening prudential regulations and supervisory oversight. The restructuring has been aided by a large injection of public funds. To spur restructuring, partial deposit insurance was reintroduced on January 1, 2001 and the blanket guarantee was removed. The market, however, remains nervous about the health of the banking system largely because significant asset quality problems remain. The problems in the investment trust sector and merchant banks continue to hamper financial intermediation, but are no longer seen as systemic threat.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors commended the authorities on the considerable achievements under the three-year stand-by arrangement that expired in December 2000. Directors noted that Korea"s recent economic performance has been impressive with high growth, low inflation, a fall in unemployment, and a marked strengthening of the external position that has resulted in a sizable current account surplus and substantial build-up of international reserves, while short-term external debt was contained to reasonable levels. Furthermore, structural reforms have made Korea"s economy more open, competitive, and market oriented; these reforms will continue to yield benefits for many years to come. Directors also welcomed the authorities" intention to make early repurchases of Fund credit and to repay the outstanding amount by August 2001.
Directors noted that the external environment has recently become less favorable, and with domestic demand also weakening, growth in 2001 is expected to fall to about half the level seen in 2000. They pointed out, however, that Korea has substantial upside potential waiting to be harnessed. In particular, Directors noted that the continued weakness of the corporate and financial sectors is imposing an increasing drag on the economy. Directors, therefore, stressed that it will be critical to deepen and accelerate restructuring to ensure sustainable high growth in the medium term.
Directors welcomed the authorities" focus on fiscal consolidation and noted that the budget had returned to surplus in 2000, four years ahead of schedule. Some Directors considered, however, that this rapid pace of consolidation may have unduly contributed to the recent weakening of the recovery and, taking note of the projected growth slowdown, were in favor of more fiscal stimulus, while stressing the need to avoid a stop-go pattern of fiscal policy. They noted that there is scope to expand spending on the social safety net, especially if the economy slows more sharply than expected or if restructuring leads to a marked rise in unemployment. Directors encouraged the authorities to explore how to improve the accuracy of intra-year budget monitoring in order to ensure against inadvertent fiscal tightening. They also encouraged the authorities to prepare a plan to address the shortcomings identified in the fiscal transparency report, and welcomed the authorities" intention to publish that report.
Directors commended the Bank of Korea on progress achieved with the implementation of the inflation targeting framework, but agreed that further efforts to enhance accountability and transparency are needed. They noted that the inflation target for 2001 has been set slightly above the medium-term target of 2.5 percent to accommodate the inflationary impact of recent oil price increases. Several Directors advised the authorities to keep monetary policy oriented to achieving the medium-term inflation target, but considered that the recent weakening in the growth outlook might justify a temporary loosening in monetary policy. Directors also welcomed the greater exchange rate flexibility that has been achieved in recent months, but reiterated that intervention should be limited to instances where trading is exceptionally disorderly.
Directors noted with concern that, despite commendable progress, a large portion of the corporate sector continues to suffer from serious weaknesses, with repercussions for financial sector stability. They therefore strongly welcomed the authorities" renewed commitment to further reform in these areas and encouraged them to proceed without delay. Directors noted that the improved social safety net should help the economy absorb the temporary dislocations that may result from the process of restructuring. They also emphasized the critical importance of developing a sufficient social consensus in favor of the needed shift from preserving old jobs in sunset industries to creating new jobs in vibrant growing industries.
Directors expressed concern that the corporate sector remains highly leveraged and that its profitability is still low. They referred to the continuing decay and loss of value in Daewoo affiliates and the ongoing problems of some Hyundai affiliates. Directors agreed that, for viable companies, management and creditors need to focus on de-leveraging, the sale of non-core assets, and on operational restructuring to allow these companies to return to profitability. For nonviable companies, banks should be more forceful in pushing for liquidation before values decline further. In view of the mixed record of out-of-court workouts, Directors suggested that greater reliance be put on court-supervised insolvency to accelerate the restructuring of distressed companies. In this context, further insolvency reform and the introduction of prepackaged bankruptcies are essential to enhance the capacity of courts to handle insolvency cases. Directors also urged the authorities to refrain from pushing creditors into bailing out troubled companies, and to maintain an open attitude to foreign involvement (including purchases of assets) in the restructuring process. Over the longer term, stronger corporate governance practices will be crucial to allow markets to drive the process of corporate restructuring.
Commenting on the increased use of collateralized bond obligations and the establishment of bond market funds, Directors noted that some government intervention may have been justified, given the bunching of maturities and the current weak demand for bonds. Nevertheless, Directors cautioned the authorities to ensure that these measures are transitory, keep distortions to a minimum, are limited to viable firms with temporary financing problems, and avoid the perception that some companies are "too big to fail." Directors stressed that a durable solution to the problems in the bond market will require restructuring efforts aimed at reducing leverage in the corporate sector.
Directors noted that the overall condition of the financial sector continues to improve, but the viability of several banks remains unclear. They welcomed the approval of additional public funds for financial sector restructuring and, in particular, the government"s commitment to a greater degree of transparency and disclosure in the use of such funds. To minimize moral hazard, ensure effective use of the funds, and contain future claims on the budget, Directors stressed that all injections should be tied to restructuring and permanent solutions to financial sector problems. They also welcomed the reintroduction of partial deposit insurance as part of the shift to market discipline.
On financial consolidation, Directors cautioned against the establishment of financial conglomerates in the absence of an adequate governance and regulatory infrastructure and before the banks, which will be at the center of such conglomerates, are themselves financially strong and well managed. While welcoming a number of steps toward establishing such an infrastructure, they urged the authorities to ensure that the current plan to merge smaller banks with a large bank into a financial holding company, be implemented without compromising the health or restructuring of larger, systemically important banks. With regard to non-bank financial institutions, Directors welcomed the recent legislation to strengthen the fiduciary responsibility of managers and trustees, and looked forward to its implementation. More generally, they stressed that it will be critical for supervisory authorities to resist pressures for forbearance and to ensure that supervisors and managers shift from focusing on rules-based observance of standards to pro-active risk management.
Directors noted that the basic framework for restructuring is in place and the key issue remains implementation and ensuring a stronger role for markets to drive the process. In this regard, they noted that Korea is a mature economy and that it will now be important for the government to step back from intervening in the operation of markets and economic decision making, and instead rely in the future on markets in imposing discipline.
Directors welcomed Korea"s continuing close cooperation with the Fund, including through post-program monitoring and Korea"s participation in the forthcoming Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
Noting that Korea"s statistical base is adequate to conduct effective surveillance, Directors encouraged the authorities to continue to make progress in improving the coverage, periodicity, and timeliness of data.
- 진념 재경장관 아시안 월스트리트저널 기고문(원문)
- Korea’s Approach to Corporate Restructuring
It is now a consensus view that the main cause of the Korean financial crisis of 1997 was a lack of market discipline and the malfunctioning of the market system rather than macroeconomic imbalances. Thus, the Korean government’s role in establishing a well-functioning market system is imperative, not only for a quick turnaround of the Korean economy but also for convincing, sustainable growth.
Once such a system is solidly put into place, the government can then take a backseat and let market forces prevail. Its role at this mature stage should be limited to that of surveillance and ensuring that market discipline is upheld without any exceptions. In the initial stages of restructuring, however, prompt, speedy restructuring becomes a distant reality in the absence of government’s active role. Korea’s corporate restructuring has been proceeding exactly along this path.
It is true that the rapid recovery of the past two years, which earned Korea praise from the international community, has led to a false sense of complacency. Political support for many tough initial reform measures has weakened. However, Korea has not yet lost its flexibility, its ability to learn quickly and its readiness to implement reforms.
In fact, the government has become more serious about structural reforms in the financial, corporate and public sectors, especially since August. It has provided a new impetus to reform efforts, witnessed, for example, by putting Daewoo Motor into court receivership, accelerating the privatization process of public enterprises such as Korea Electric Power Corp. and by consolidating the commercial banking system through financial holding companies as well as mergers.
While the concerns of foreign investors are understandable, I would like to clarify that Korea’s corporate restructuring is fundamentally different from the past attempts to improve the business sector, particularly with regard to the chaebols. The lessons of Daewoo group suggest that no chaebol is too big to fail. This principle was confirmed again when creditor banks firmly refused new loan requests from the construction firms Woobang and Dong-Ah.
Recognizing an investor concern that Korea is reluctant to cut loose its “zombie” companies, creditor banks have recently disclosed a list of 52 non-viable companies that need to be placed under court receivership or liquidation programs. This is an important achievement toward establishing a market system in which market forces monitor the viability of companies and weed out non-viable companies in an efficient manner.
If the government in the past directly intervened in the fate of the companies, it is now empowering financial institutions to take on the role of monitoring the financial health of their borrowers and taking appropriate measures to ensure their soundness. This can further be facilitated by the presence of a continuous exit system, in which non-viable companies are removed from the market in an expeditious manner.
For example, as of the end of 1999 the Korean government has made financial institutions adopt a more rigorous asset-classification standard called “Forward Looking Criteria.” With the FLC system in place, Korean banks now have a clear concept of loss-cut and are actually taking actions since their potential losses are already reflected in their books. Sufficient accumulation of the loss provisioning induces lenders to be more aggressive in taking actions toward non-viable borrowers.
The deregulation of mergers and acquisitions is another example. Hostile M&A have already been legalized. Even leveraged buy-out schemes will be allowed from this year. M&A procedures will be further streamlined, in line with international norms.
I cannot leave out the importance of strengthened corporate governance in the process of Korea’s corporate restructuring. The Korean government has made it mandatory for listed companies with large assets to appoint half of their board of directors from outside the company. It also obligated those firms to set up an independent audit committee.
With these measures fully implemented, Korea should be able to fast-forward the transition to a market-driven economy. The obligation by law and regulation is inevitable in order to move toward clear, clean management, which in turn will speed up the changes in business practices and the mindset of management.
I would like to assure investors looking to Korea that the Korean corporate sector, including the chaebol system, is being reshaped for the better. Among the 30 largest chaebol groups in 1997, only 16 remain today as a result of sweeping restructuring.
The emergence of a liquidity crisis at Hyundai Engineering & Construction, which has not been able to get financial support from other affiliates of the Hyundai Group, is another clear reflection of Korea’s changing business environment. The company’s liquidity trouble would not have surfaced under the old system, which formed big business groups to shield their troubles with cross-debt guarantees and intra-group transactions, both of which are now banned.
Of course, corporate restructuring presents many challenging tasks ahead. The recent financial market instability indicates that market mechanisms are still weak. Investor confidence has also suffered from recent developments, mainly because of the economic slowdown and resurgence of labor union activities.
Again, I would like to assure that the Korean labor movement of today is fundamentally different from those of yesterday. Gone are the militant, sometimes violent movements of yesterday. The current labor strife is void of violence or any disturbance to public order.
The labor unions seem to be aware that only through the successful completion of structural reforms will there be more jobs tomorrow. A case in point is Daewoo Motor, which was once one of Korea’s more militant unions, but which has recently agreed to staff reductions as asked by creditor banks.
It should also be noted that the social environment surrounding the Korean labor market has improved significantly over the past three years. The social safety net has been dramatically expanded, and job replacement and training programs, which were non-existent in pre-crisis Korea, exist today.
As for the recent slowdown, no economy is immune to business cycles. We all know that double-digit economic growth is generally not sustainable. Therefore the recent slowdown itself can be understood as the normal cyclical rebalance and adjustment to the tune of a global economic slowdown. Fortunately so, the recent economic slowdown, financial instability and unfavorable external environment all work to renew Korea’s reform drive.
The Korean government fully recognizes that the successful completion of the ongoing restructuring is the only means for Korea to lay a basis for sustainable growth.
This is why the government has announced a “Second Round Restructuring Plan” with a target date. It is intended to give a clear signal to market participants about the government’s policy priorities. However, it should not be interpreted as a final date of completion of the restructuring process. Successful restructuring in the United Kingdom and the United States has shown that the process is lengthy and oftentimes painstaking.
The Korean government will not waiver from its goal of establishing a well-functioning market-driven system and providing a transparent and internationally compatible business environment. These objectives are clearly reflected in the new year’s basic policy directives: inducing a market-friendly financial and corporate reforms; developing new opportunities for economic growth and capitalizing on the digital economy; strengthening the social safety net and pursuing balanced growth across regions within Korea; and improving the market sentiments.
I remain fairly confident that Korea’s economic situation will improve in response to the deepening and acceleration of these initiatives. And the government has the clear vision and will to put them into action.
- MSCI가 정의한 "FREE FLOAT" (원문)
- 다음은 MSCI가 새로 연 "MSCI Float & coverage 웹사이트"에서 밝힌 프리 플로트(fee-float) 산정방식의 정의입니다.
MSCI FREE FLOAT-ADJUSTMENT DEFINITION
MSCI will adjust the market capitalization of a company’s equity securities to reflect their level of free float. MSCI defines the free float as the proportion of share capital that is deemed to be available for purchase in the public equity markets by international investors. In practice, limitations on the investment opportunities available to the international investors include:
ㅁStrategic shareholdings: Stakes held by private or public shareholders whose investment objectives suggest that those holdings are not likely to be traded in the market. In practice, disclosure requirements generally do not permit a clear determination of these investment objectives. Therefore, MSCI classifies hareholdings as strategic or non-strategic based on a categorization of investor types.
ㅁLimits on share ownership for foreigners: Limits on the proportion of a security’s share capital that is authorized for purchase by non-domestic investors. Where they exist, these foreign share-ownership limits are generally set by law, government regulations, or company by-laws.
ㅁOther foreign investment restrictions: Investment restrictions, other than those described above, which materially limit the ability of international investors to freely invest in a particular equity market. There is typically no simple way to account for these limitations in a benchmark, as these restrictions tend to be more subtle and complex, and may affect different market participants in different ways.
Shareholding classification guidelines
MSCI primarily classifies shareholdings as strategic or non-strategic based on a categorization of investor types.
ㅁStrategic shareholders: The following investor types are generally considered as strategic and their shareholdings in a company are not included in that company’s equity capital to determine its free float:
=Governments: Shares owned by governments and affiliated entities. Please refer to the specific guidelines described below for government agencies and government-related investment funds.
=Corporations: Shares owned by corporations, including treasury shares owned by the
company itself, except when the treasury shares are excluded from the number of shares outstanding. Please refer to specific guidelines for banks.
=Management and Board Members: Shares owned by members of the company’s management or Board of Directors, including shares owned by individuals or families that are related to or closely affiliated with members of the company’s management, Board of
Directors, or founding members deemed to be insiders.
=Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Shares owned in ESOPs during the lock-up
period.
ㅁNon-Strategic shareholders: The following investor types are generally considered as non-strategic and their shareholdings in a company are included in that company’s equity capital to determine its free float:
=Individuals: Shares owned by individuals, excluding shares owned by individuals or
families that are related to or closely affiliated with members of the company’s
management, Board of Directors or founding members deemed to be insiders, and,
excluding those shareholdings held by individuals whose significant size suggests that they are strategic in nature.
=Investment funds, mutual funds or unit trusts: Shares owned in investment funds,
mutual funds and unit trusts, including shares owned in passively managed funds.
=Pension funds: Shares owned in employee pension funds, excluding shares of the
employing company, its subsidiaries or affiliates.
=Insurance companies: In principle, the investment objective of portfolio holdings of
insurance companies is non-strategic. When there are reasons to believe that an insurance company’s shareholding is strategic, it will not be included in free float.
=Social security funds: Shares owned in social security funds, unless the fund’s
management is deemed to exert influence over the management of the company.
=Venture capital funds: Shares owned in venture capital funds, unless a specific
investment is deemed to be strategic in nature.
In the event that the above categories should not appropriately capture the nature of a specific shareholding, its classification as strategic or non-strategic will be determined based on a more extensive analysis. In particular, the following guidelines will be followed:
=Banks. Shareholdings by banks are considered as strategic, excluding, when identifiable, specific shareholdings that are deemed to be non-strategic.
=Nominees or trustees: Shareholdings registered in the name of a nominee or trustee are classified as strategic or non-strategic based on an analysis of who is the ultimate beneficial owner of the shares, according to the above definitions.
=Government agencies and government-related investment funds: Shareholdings of
government agencies and government-related investment funds are classified based on an analysis of the objective of the investment.
=Shares placed in IPOs with special incentives: Shares that are placed in an IPO and
that include meaningful incentives to hold the shares for a specific period of time, are classified as strategic until those incentives expire.
=ADRs and GDRs: Shares that are deposited to back the issuance of ADRs and GDRs
are classified as non-strategic, unless it is established that a specific stake held in ADRs or GDRs is strategic in nature.
Calculation of a security’s free float-adjusted market capitalization
As a general rule, MSCI calculates the free float of a security as its total number of shares outstanding less shareholdings classified as strategic and shares otherwise restricted from trading by international investors. However, the determination of the corresponding free float-adjusted market capitalization is dependent on the nature of the limitations on free float.
In all cases, the calculation is based solely on publicly available shareholding information obtained from multiple information sources. For each security, all available shareholdings are considered where public data is available, regardless of size.
ㅁCalculation in the case of a security which is not subject to a foreign ownership limit or other foreign investment restrictions
=Strategic shareholding(%)=(Number of shares classified as strategic/Total number of shares outstanding)
=Free float (%) = 100% - Strategic shareholding (%)
=For constituents with free float greater than or equal to 15%, the security’s Inclusion Factor is equal to its estimated free float, rounded-up to the closest 5%.
=Securities with free float less than 15% are typically not eligible for inclusion in the indices. However, in exceptional cases, where including such a security would significantly improve the index’s ability to accurately represent the investment opportunities in that country or industry, the security may be included in the indices with an Inclusion Factor equal to its estimated free float rounded to the closest 1%.
=Free float-adjusted market capitalization = Inclusion Factor * total market capitalization
=Examples:
Company A Company B
Total number of shares outstanding 10,000,000 10,000,000
Number of shares classified as strategic 4100,000 8,780,000
Strategic shareholding (%) 41.0% 87.8%
Free float (%) 59.0% 12.2%
Inclusion Factor 0.60 0.12
ㅁCalculation in the case of a security which is subject to a foreign ownership limit
Number of shares held by foreign strategic investors
=Foreign strategic shareholding(%)=----------------------------------------
Total number of shares outstanding
=Free float available to foreign investors (%) is equal to the lesser of:
-the free float, calculated as: 100% - strategic shareholding (including both foreign and domestic strategic shareholders) (%)
- the foreign ownership limit less the foreign strategic shareholding (%)
=For constituents whose free float available to foreign investors is greater than or equal to 15%, the security’s Inclusion Factor is equal to the lesser of:
-the estimated free float available to foreign investors rounded-up to the closest 5%;
-the foreign ownership limit rounded to the closest 1%.
-Securities with a free float available to foreign investors of less than 15% are typically not eligible for inclusion in the indices. However, in exceptional cases, where including such a security would significantly improve the index’s ability to accurately represent the investment opportunities in that country or industry, the security may be included in the indices with an Inclusion Factor equal to its estimated free float available to foreign investors rounded to the closest 1%.
-Free float-adjusted market capitalization = Inclusion Factor * total market capitalization
-Examples:
Company C Company D Company E
Total number of shares outstanding 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
All shares classified as strategic 8,100,000 4,000,000 4,000,000
- those held by foreigners as strategic 1,000,000 1,000,000 -
Strategic shareholding (%) 81.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Free float (%) 19.0% 60.0% 60.0%
Foreign Ownership Limit 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Foreign strategic shareholding (%) 10.0% 10.0% 0.0%
Foreign Ownership Limit less the Foreign
strategic shareholding (%) 23.3% 23.3% 33.3%
Free float available to
foreign investors(%) 19.0% 23.3% 33.3%
Inclusion Factor 0.20 0.25 0.33
ㅁIn the case of a security which is subject to other foreign investment restrictions
In the case where other foreign investment restrictions exist, which materially limit the ability of international investors to freely invest in equity markets, an additional Limited Investability Factor may be applied. There is typically no simple way to account for these types of investability limitations in a benchmark as they tend to be subtle and complex, and may affect different market participants in different ways. Therefore, where warranted, the Limited Investability Factor will be determined based on an extensive case-by-case analysis.
