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- 김 대통령, `미 대응조치 전폭지지` 메시지 전달(전문)
- [edaily] 김대중 대통령은 17일 오전 미 테러참사와 관련, 한국정부가 미국의 조치를 적극 지지하고 미국 동맹국으로서 지원에 참여한다는 내용의 메시지를 부시 대통령에게 보냈다고 청와대 오홍근 대변인이 밝혔다.
다음은 청와대 대변인의 발표내용과 메시지 전문(영문 포함)
▲김대중 대통령은 이번 미국 테러 참사와 관련한 미 정부의 대응조치에 대해 우리 정부가 미국의 조치를 적극 지지하고, 한·미 상호방위조약의 정신에 따라 미국의 동맹국으로서 지원할 것이며 국제적 연합에도 참여한다는 내용의 메시지를 부시 미국 대통령에게 전달하였다.
김 대통령은 지난 9월 12일 이번 테러행위를 규탄하고 테러근절을 위한 노력에 적극 동참하겠다는 입장을 밝힌 데 이어, 부시대통령이 이번 테러행위를 전쟁행위로 선포함에 따라 미국의 동맹국으로서 미 정부의 대응조치에 대한 적극적 지지를 표하기 위해 이번 메시지를 전달하게 된 것이다.
김 대통령의 이번 메세지는 미국 및 국제사회의 테러대응 조치를 지지하고 이에 동참한다는 원칙적인 입장표명이다. 한편, 우리의 구체적인 대미 지원내용은 미국측의 구체적인 요청이 있을 때 검토할 예정이다.
▲메시지전문
(국문) 본인과 한국 국민은 금번 테러사태와 관련, 미 국민들이 각하의 영도하에 일치 단결하여 신속한 사태수습 노력을 전개하고 있는데 경의를 표하면서, 각하께서 금번 테러를 전쟁행위로 선포하는 등 확고한 결의를 가지고 테러를 근절하기 위한 노력을 기울이고 계신 것을 전폭적으로 지지합니다.
한국 정부는 한·미 상호방위조약 정신에 따라, 미국의 동맹국으로서 필요한 모든 협력과 지원을 아끼지 않을 것이며, 테러행위 근절을 위한 미국의 행동을 지원하는 국제적 연합에 참여할 것임을 말씀드립니다.
(영문) On behalf of the Korean people, I would like to express my highest respect to the American people who are solidly united under your distinguished leadership in the effects to overcome the overwhelming difficulties your great nation is currently faced with. The Korean people and I fully support your firm resolution to root out such terrorism, as evidenced by your declaration of the current acts of terror as "acts of war", and your steadfast efforts to this end.
I assure you that the Republic of Korea will provide all necessary cooperation and assistance as a close U.S.ally in the spirit of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, and will take part in the international coalition to support the U.S.actions against terrorism.
- <그린스펀 증언-3> 의회 증언 전문
- [edaily] 다음은 앨런 그린스펀 연준리 의장의 의회 증언 전문입니다.
This is the full text of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan"s testimony delivered July 18, 2001, to the House Committee on Financial Services.
I appreciate the opportunity this morning to present the Federal Reserve"s semiannual report on monetary policy.
Monetary policy this year has confronted an economy that slowed sharply late last year and has remained weak this year, following an extraordinary period of buoyant expansion.
By aggressively easing the stance of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve has moved to support demand and, we trust, help lay the groundwork for the economy to achieve maximum sustainable growth. Our accelerated action reflected the pronounced downshift in economic activity, which was accentuated by the especially prompt and synchronous adjustment of production by businesses utilizing the faster flow of information coming from the adoption of new technologies. A rapid and sizable easing was made possible by reasonably well-anchored inflation expectations, which helped to keep underlying inflation at a modest rate, and by the prospect that inflation would remain contained as resource utilization eased and energy prices backed down.
In addition to the more accommodative stance of monetary policy, demand should be assisted going forward by the effects of the tax cut, by falling energy costs, by the spur to production once businesses work down their inventories to more comfortable levels, and, most important, by the inducement to resume increases in capital spending. That inducement should be provided by the continuation of cost-saving opportunities associated with rapid technological innovation. Such innovation has been the driving force raising the growth of structural productivity over the last half-dozen years. To be sure, measured productivity has softened in recent quarters, but by no more than one would anticipate from cyclical influences layered on top of a faster long-term trend.
But the uncertainties surrounding the current economic situation are considerable, and, until we see more concrete evidence that the adjustments of inventories and capital spending are well along, the risks would seem to remain mostly tilted toward weakness in the economy. Still, the FOMC opted for a smaller policy move at our last meeting because we recognized that the effects of policy actions are felt with a lag, and, with our cumulative 2-3/4 percentage points of easing this year, we have moved a considerable distance in the direction of monetary stimulus. Certainly, should conditions warrant, we may need to ease further, but we must not lose sight of the prerequisite of longer-run price stability for realizing the economy"s full growth potential over time.
Despite the recent economic slowdown, the past decade has been extraordinary for the American economy. The synergies of key technologies markedly elevated prospective rates of return on high-tech investments, led to a surge in business capital spending, and significantly increased the growth rate of structural productivity. The capitalization of those higher expected returns lifted equity prices, which in turn contributed to a substantial pickup in household spending on a broad range of goods and services, especially on new homes and durable goods. This increase in spending by both households and businesses exceeded even the enhanced rise in real household incomes and business earnings. The evident attractiveness of investment opportunities in the United States induced substantial inflows of funds from abroad, raising the dollar"s exchange rate while financing a growing portion of domestic spending.
By early 2000, the surge in household and business purchases had increased growth of the stocks of many types of consumer durable goods and business capital equipment to rates that could not be sustained. Even though demand for a number of high-tech products was doubling or tripling annually, in some cases new supply was coming on even faster. Overall, capacity in high-tech manufacturing industries, for example, rose nearly 50 percent last year, well in excess of its already rapid rate of increase over the previous three years. Hence, a temporary glut in these industries and falling short-term prospective rates of return were inevitable at some point. This tendency was reinforced by a more realistic evaluation of the prospects for returns on some high-tech investments, which, while still quite elevated by historical standards, apparently could not measure up to the previous exaggerated hopes. Moreover, as I testified before this Committee last year, the economy as a whole was growing at an unsustainable pace, drawing further on an already diminished pool of available workers and relying increasingly on savings from abroad. Clearly, some moderation in the pace of spending was necessary and expected if the economy was to progress along a more balanced growth path.
In the event, the adjustment occurred much faster than most businesses anticipated, with the slowdown likely intensified by the rise in the cost of energy that until quite recently had drained businesses and households of purchasing power. Growth of outlays of consumer durable goods slowed in the middle of 2000, and shipments of nondefense capital goods have declined since autumn.
Moreover, weakness emerged more recently among our trading partners in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The interaction of slowdowns in a number of countries simultaneously has magnified the softening each of the individual economies would have experienced on its own.
Because the extent of the slowdown was not anticipated by businesses, some backup in inventories occurred, especially in the United States. Innovations, such as more advanced supply-chain management and flexible manufacturing technologies, have enabled firms to adjust production levels more rapidly to changes in sales. But these improvements apparently have not solved the thornier problem of correctly anticipating demand. Although inventory-sales ratios in most industries rose only moderately, those measures should be judged against businesses" desired levels. In this regard, extrapolation of the downtrend in inventory-sales ratios over the past decade suggests that considerable imbalances emerged late last year. Confirming this impression, purchasing managers in the manufacturing sector reported in January that inventories in the hands of their customers had risen to excessively high levels.
As a result, a round of inventory rebalancing was undertaken, and the slowdown in the economy that began in the middle of 2000 intensified. The adjustment process started late last year when manufacturers began to cut production to stem the accumulation of unwanted inventories. But inventories did not actually begin falling until early this year as producers decreased output levels considerably further.
Much of the inventory reduction in the first quarter reflected a dramatic scaling back of motor vehicle assemblies. However, inventories of computers, semiconductors, and communications products continued to build into the first quarter, and these stocks are only belatedly being brought under control. As best we can judge, some progress seems to have been made on inventories of semiconductors and computers, but little gain is apparent with respect to communications equipment. Inventories of high-tech products overall have probably been reduced a bit, but a period of substantial liquidation of stocks still seemingly lies ahead for these products.
For all inventories, the rate of liquidation appears to have been especially pronounced this winter, and the available data suggest that it continued, though perhaps at a more moderate pace, this spring. A not inconsequential proportion of the current liquidation undoubtedly is of imported products, and thus will presumably affect foreign production, but most of the adjustment has fallen on domestic producers.
At some point, inventory liquidation will come to an end, and its termination will spur production and incomes. Of course, the timing and force with which that process of recovery plays out will depend on the behavior of final demand. In that regard, the demand for capital equipment, particularly in the near term, could pose a continuing problem. Despite evidence that expected long-term rates of return on the newer technologies remain high, growth of investment in equipment and software has turned decidedly negative. Sharp increases in uncertainties about the short-term outlook have significantly foreshortened the time frame over which business are requiring new capital projects to pay off. The consequent heavier discounts applied to those long-term expectations have induced a major scaling back of new capital spending initiatives, though one that presumably is not long-lasting given the continuing inducements to embody improving technologies in new capital equipment.
In addition, a deterioration in sales, profitability, and cash flow has exacerbated the weakness in capital spending. Pressures on profit margins have been unrelenting. Although earnings weakness has been most pronounced for high-tech firms, where the previous extraordinary pace of expansion left oversupply in its wake, weakness is evident virtually across the board, including most recently in earnings of the foreign affiliates of American firms.
Much of the squeeze on profit margins of domestic operations results from a rise in unit labor costs. Gains in compensation per hour picked up over the past year or so, responding to a long period of tight labor markets, the earlier acceleration of productivity, and the effects of an energy-induced run-up in consumer prices. The faster upward movement in hourly compensation, coupled with the cyclical slowdown in the growth of output per hour, has elevated the rate of increase in unit labor costs. In part, fixed costs, nonlabor as well as labor, are being spread over a smaller production base for many industries.
The surge in energy costs has also pressed down on profit margins, especially in the fourth and first quarters. In fact, a substantial portion of the rise in total costs of domestic nonfinancial corporations between the second quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year reflected the increase in energy costs. The decline in energy prices since the spring, however, should be contributing positively to margins in the third quarter. Moreover, the rate of increase in compensation is likely to moderate, with inflation expectations contained and labor markets becoming less taut in response to the slower pace of growth in economic activity. In addition, continued rapid gains in structural productivity should help to suppress the rise in unit labor costs over time.
Eventually, the high-tech correction will abate, and these industries will reestablish themselves as a solidly expanding, though less frenetic, part of our economy. When they do, growth in that sector presumably will not return to the outsized 50 percent annual growth rates of last year, but rather to a more sustainable pace.
Of course, investment spending ultimately depends on the strength of consumer demand for goods and services. Here, too, longer-run increases in real incomes of consumers engendered by the rapid advances in structural productivity should provide support to demand over time. And thus far this year, consumer spending has indeed risen further, presumably assisted in part by a continued rapid growth in the market value of homes, from which a significant amount of equity is being extracted. Moreover, household disposable income is now being bolstered by tax cuts.
But there are also downside risks to consumer spending over the next few quarters. Importantly, the same pressure on profits and the heightened sense of risk that have held down investment have also lowered equity prices and reduced household wealth despite the rise in home equity. We can expect the decline in stock market wealth that has occurred over the past year to restrain the growth of household spending relative to income, just as the previous increase gave an extra spur to household demand. Furthermore, while most survey measures suggest consumer sentiment has stabilized recently, softer job markets could induce a further deterioration in confidence and spending intentions.
While this litany of risks should not be downplayed, it is notable how well the U.S. economy has withstood the many negative forces weighing on it. Economic activity has held up remarkably in the face of a difficult adjustment toward a more sustainable pattern of expansion.
The economic developments of the last couple of years have been a particular challenge for monetary policy. Once the financial crises of late 1998 that followed the Russian default eased, efforts to address Y2K problems and growing optimism--if not euphoria--about profit opportunities produced a surge in investment, particularly in high-tech equipment and software. The upswing outstripped what the nation could finance on a sustainable basis from domestic saving and funds attracted from abroad.
The shortfall of saving to finance investment showed through in a significant rise in average real long-term corporate interest rates starting in early 1999. By June of that year, it was evident to the Federal Open Market Committee that to continue to hold the funds rate at the then-prevailing level of 4-3/4 percent in the face of rising real long-term corporate rates would have required a major infusion of liquidity into an economy already threatening to overheat. In fact, the increase in our target federal funds rate of 175 basis points through May of 2000 barely slowed the expansion of liquidity, judging from the M2 measure of the money supply, whose rate of increase declined only modestly through the tightening period.
By summer of last year, it started to become apparent that the growth of demand finally was slowing, and seemingly by enough to bring it into approximate alignment with the expansion of potential supply, as indicated by the fact that the pool of available labor was no longer being drawn down. It was well into autumn, however, before one could be confident that the growth of aggregate demand had softened enough to bring it into a more lasting balance with potential supply. Growth continued to decline to a point that by our December meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee decided that the time to counter cumulative economic weakness was close at hand. We altered our assessment of the risks to the economy, and with incoming information following the meeting continuing to be downbeat, we took our first easing action on January 3. We viewed the faster downshift in economic activity, in part a consequence of the technology-enhanced speed and volume of information flows, as calling for a quicker pace of policy adjustment. Acting on that view, we have lowered the federal funds rate 2-3/4 percentage points since the turn of the year, with last month"s action leaving the federal funds rate at 3-3/4 percent.
Most long-term interest rates, however, have barely budged despite the appreciable reductions in short-term rates since the beginning of the year. This has led many commentators to ask whether inflation expectations have risen. Surely, one reason long-term rates have held up is changed expectations in the Treasury market, as forecasts of the unified budget surplus were revised down, indicating that the supplies of outstanding marketable Treasury debt are unlikely to shrink as rapidly as previously anticipated. Beyond that, it is difficult to judge whether long-term rates have held up because of firming inflation expectations or a belief that economic growth is likely to strengthen, spurring a rise in real long-term rates.
One measure often useful in separating the real interest rates from inflation expectations is the spread between rates on nominal ten-year Treasury notes and inflation-indexed notes of similar maturity. That spread rose more than three-fourths of a percentage point through the first five months of this year, a not insignificant change, though half of that increase has been reversed since. By the nature of the indexed instrument, the spread between it and the comparable nominal rate reflects expected CPI inflation. While actual CPI inflation has picked up this year, this rise has not been mirrored uniformly in other broad price measures. For example, there has been little, if any, acceleration in the index of core personal consumption expenditure prices, which we consider to be a more reliable measure of inflation. Moreover, survey readings on long term inflation expectations have remained quite stable.
The lack of pricing power reported overwhelmingly by business people underscores the quiescence of inflationary pressures. Businesses are experiencing the effects of softer demand in product markets overall, but these effects have been especially marked for many producers at earlier stages of processing, where prices generally have been flat to down thus far this year. With energy prices now also moving lower and the lessening of tautness in labor markets expected to damp wage increases, overall prices seem likely to be contained in the period ahead.
Forecasts of inflation, however, like all economic forecasts, do not have an enviable record. Faced with such uncertainties, a central bank"s vigilance against inflation is more than a monetary policy cliche; it is, of course, the way we fulfill our ultimate mandate to promote maximum sustainable growth.
A central bank can contain inflation over time under most conditions. But do we have the capability to eliminate booms and busts in economic activity? Can fiscal and monetary policy acting at their optimum eliminate the business cycle, as some of the more optimistic followers of J.M. Keynes seemed to believe several decades ago?
The answer, in my judgment, is no, because there is no tool to change human nature. Too often people are prone to recurring bouts of optimism and pessimism that manifest themselves from time to time in the buildup or cessation of speculative excesses. As I have noted in recent years, our only realistic response to a speculative bubble is to lean against the economic pressures that may accompany a rise in asset prices, bubble or not, and address forcefully the consequences of a sharp deflation of asset prices should they occur.
While we are limited in our ability to anticipate and act on asset price bubbles, expectations about future economic developments nonetheless inevitably play a crucial role in our policymaking. If we react only to past or current developments, lags in the effects of monetary policy could end up destabilizing the economy, as history has amply demonstrated.
Because accurate point forecasts are extraordinarily difficult to fashion, we are forced also to consider the probability distribution of possible economic outcomes. Against these distributions, we endeavor to judge the possible consequences of various alternative policy actions, especially the consequences of a policy mistake. We recognize that this policy process may require substantial swings in the federal funds rate over time to help stabilize the economy, as, for example, recurring bouts of consumer and business optimism and pessimism drive economic activity.
In reducing the federal funds rate so substantially this year, we have been responding to our judgment that a good part of the recent weakening of demand was likely to persist for a while, and that there were significant downside risks even to a reduced central tendency forecast. Moreover, with inflation low and likely to be contained, the main threat to satisfactory economic performance appeared to come from excessive weakness in activity.
As a consequence of the policy actions of the FOMC, some of the stringent financial conditions evident late last year have been eased. Real interest rates are down on a wide variety of borrowing instruments. Private rates have benefited from some narrowing of risk premiums in many markets. And the growth of liquidity, as measured by M2, has picked up. More recently, incoming data on economic activity have turned from persistently negative to more mixed.
The period of sub-par economic performance, however, is not yet over, and we are not free of the risk that economic weakness will be greater than currently anticipated, and require further policy response. That weakness could arise from softer demand abroad as well as from domestic developments. But we need also to be aware that our front-loaded policy actions this year coupled with the tax cuts under way should be increasingly affecting economic activity as the year progresses.
The views of the Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents reflect this assessment. While recognizing the downside risks to their current forecast, most anticipate at least a slight strengthening of real activity later this year. This is implied by the central tendency of their individual projections, which is for real GDP growth over all four quarters of 2001 of 1-1/4 to 2 percent. Next year, the comparable figures are 3 to 3-1/4 percent. The civilian unemployment rate is projected to rise further over the second half of the year, with a central tendency of 4-3/4 to 5 percent by the fourth quarter and 4-3/4 to 5-1/4 percent four quarters later. This easing of pressures in product and labor markets lies behind the central tendency for PCE price inflation of 2 to 2-1/2 percent over the four quarters of this year and 1-3/4 to 2-1/2 percent next year.
As for the years beyond this horizon, there is still, in my judgment, ample evidence that we are experiencing only a pause in the investment in a broad set of innovations that has elevated the underlying growth in productivity to a rate significantly above that of the two decades preceding 1995. By all evidence, we are not yet dealing with maturing technologies that, after having sparkled for a half-decade, are now in the process of fizzling out. To the contrary, once the forces that are currently containing investment initiatives dissipate, new applications of innovative technologies should again strengthen demand for capital equipment and restore solid economic growth over time that benefits us all.
- 미 전자제품 판매사 지난해 두자릿수 고도성장
- [edaily] 지난해 미국의 전자제품 판매업체들은 두 자리 수의 높은 성장을 거듭한 것으로 조사됐다. 30일 대한무역투자진흥공사(KOTRA) LA무역관이 입수한 미국의 전문 유통판매 저널 ‘Purchasing’의 "상위 75개 전자제품 판매업체 설문조사(Top 75 Electronics Distributors Survey)"에 따르면 이들의 지난해 4분기 성장세는 둔화되었지만 첫 3분기 동안에는 통신관련 OEM과 계약공급업체(contract manufacturer)의 수요에 힘입어 큰폭의 성장세를 거듭한 것으로 나타났다.
이 조사에 따르면 오직 10개사만이 예년 수준이거나 오히려 예년보다 판매량이 감소했다고 나타났는데, 이러한 수치는 99년의 11개사와 별 차이가 없는 것이다. 이들 상위 75개사의 지난해 수익은 전년대비 21.8% 증가한 346억 달러로 나타났다.
특히 지난해에는 동종 업체간의 인수합병(M&A)이 많았던 것으로 조사됐다. 업계 거대기업인 Avnet Inc.사나 Arrow Electronics사 및 반도체 판매에 집중된VEBA Electronics를 인수한 Schroder Ventures의 M&A가 눈길을 끌었다.
Arrow는 반도체 전문업체인 Wyle Components, Wyle Systems 및 Atlas Services North America를 인수하고, Avnet은 유럽에 본사를 두고 있는 EBV Elektronik, Altas Logistic Serveices Europe 및 독일의 Raab Kracher Electronic Systems을 사들였다. Schroder사는 반도체 전문업체인 Impact Technologies LLC, Insight Electronics LLC 그리고 Unique Technologies LLC를 합병한 Memec을 인수했다.
한편 99년 Arrow를 제치고 1위에 올라선 Avnet은 기업인수를 통해 지난해에도 58.5%의 성장세를 기록해 수위를 지킨 것으로 나타났다. Avnet의 수익은 북미지역만 84억 달러에 달한 것으로 조사됐다.
2위인 Arrow사의 수익은 전년비 31.6% 증가한 81억 달러로 나타났다. Arrow사는 지난해 9월 Merisel Open Computing Alliance도 인수했다. 그 밖에 Bell, Future, Kent, Newark, PioneerStandard와 TTI가 모두 톱10안에 들어있다. 지난해 10위였던 Reptron은 11위로 쳐지고 새롭게 Nu Horizons가 6억5천만 달러의 판매고를 올리며 10위에 올라섰다.
Avnet에 인수될 Kent Electronics Corp.은 지난해 판매량이 11억 달러에 달한 것으로 조사됐다. 6위를 차지한 Bell Microproducts는 컴퓨터 및 관련 제품에 더욱 집중하기로 사업방향을 정한 것으로 알려졌다. 지난 2년 동안 Bell은 전체 수입면에서 컴퓨터와 관련 제품이 차지하는 비중이 55%에서 80%로 늘어났다.
All American, Nu Horizons, Reptron, TTI와 같은 거대 디스트리뷰터와 California Eastern Labs, Digi-Key, DAC 및 Jaco와 같은 중간 규모 업체들도 모두 50%를 넘는 성장을 시현했다.
비교적 규모가 작은 판매업체들도 높은 성장세를 보인 것으로 나타났다. Projections Unlimited의 경우 전년대비 무려 177.8%의 판매 증가를 기록했다. 판매액이 99년 3510만 달러에서 지난 해에는 9750억 달러로 뛰어올랐다. 이 밖에 ForeSight는 94.6%, Surface mount Distribution 84.9%, Cameron & Barkley 49%, 그리고 Steven Engineering은 50%의 매출 신장을 기록했다.
- e셀피아, 중소 사업자 위한 비즈샵 서비스 개설
- [edaily] 네트워크 경매업체 e셀피아(www.eSellpia.com)가 전문 판매자들이 경매 상점을 분양받을 수 있는 "비즈샵(Biz-Shop) 서비스"를 개설했다고 23일 밝혔다.
e셀피아는 "비즈샵 서비스" 참여업체를 대상으로 이 서비스를 이용한 판매, 운영, 관리 등 제반 기능에 대한 교육을 월1회 무료로 실시한다.
"비즈샵 서비스"는 전문 판매자들이 자체적으로 전문 경매 서비스를 할 수 있도록 한 프로그램으로, e셀피아의 전자상거래 구축 시스템인 PAS(Powerful All Commerce Service)를 이용, 중소 제조기업이나 소호 사업자들이 손쉽게 경매 사이트를 만들고 운영할 수 있도록 했다.
"비즈샵 서비스"를 이용하면 ▲아이디 만들기 ▲상품 분류 만들기 ▲추천 상품 분류 만들기 ▲홈페이지 주소 입력 등의 4단계만 거치면 업체 각각의 특성에 맞는 자체 경매 사이트가 생긴다.
사업자는 별도로 서버를 구입하거나 전자상거래 사업을 위한 보안, 결제, 배송 및 관련 인프라, 기술 없이도 특화된 경매 사이트를 갖게 된다는 장점이 있다.
e셀피아는 비즈샵 서비스를 이용하는 사업자들을 위해 ▲물품 등록 수수료 면제 ▲전문 판매를 위한 각종 홍보 및 이벤트등 판촉활동 지원 ▲전문MD와 인터넷 전문가 그룹을 통한 운영 지원 ▲신용카드 무이자 할부 판매 지원 등 혜택을 제공한다.
또 수주 고객 관리, 마케팅 분석, 재고 및 상품 관리, 매매보호장치 등을 e셀피아에서 제공하므로 특별한 전문 기술 지식 없이도 사이트의 통합 관리가 가능하다. 현재 베스톤주얼리, 선희야닷컴 등 모두 557개 업체가 참여해 활동하고 있다.
- MSCI, 예비지수 편입비중 보도자료 원문
- [edaily] 다음은 MSCI가 19일 발표한 유동주식(free-floating)을 기준한 예비지수 편입비중 관련 보도자료 원문입니다.
MSCI ANNOUNCES PROVISIONAL INDEX CONSTITUENTS
Geneva, May 19, 2001. MSCI announced today the full list of constituents and their inclusion factors for the MSCI Provisional Index Series SM . This index series has been created based on the MSCI Enhanced Methodology for free float adjusting constituents’ index weights, and targeting for index inclusion 85% of free float-adjusted market capitalization in each industry group, within each country. The complete list of
constituents and their inclusion factors, which are used to adjust the constituents’ index weights for free float, have been posted on MSCI"s web site, www.msci.com. MSCI will begin calculating the MSCI Provisional Index Series on May 31, 2001.
The MSCI Provisional Index Series has been created to assist investors in understanding the changes that would occur if the Enhanced Methodology were immediately implemented in the MSCI Standard Index Series SM . As previously announced on December 10, 2000, the Enhanced Methodology will be implemented in the MSCI Standard Index Series in two phases, as of the close of November 30, 2001 and May 31, 2002, respectively. The MSCI Provisional Index Series provides increased flexibility for investors wishing to
transition to the Enhanced Methodology on their own schedule. In addition, the MSCI Provisional Index Series is an official index series and, as such, may be used for new investment mandates and for a variety of investment vehicles such as passive mutual funds, exchange traded funds and derivative contracts.
A description of MSCI’s Enhanced Methodology has also been posted on MSCI’s web site. It provides details regarding the free float adjustment of constituents’ market capitalizations and the application of the 85% target market representation guideline. It also provides details of other methodology rules and guidelines that have been applied in the construction of the MSCI Provisional Index Series, including, but not limited to, guidelines regarding minimum constituent size for index inclusion. In addition, it provides information relating to the implementation of the first phase of the transition of the MSCI Standard Index Series to the Enhanced Methodology, scheduled for November 30, 2001, and other transition issues.
Below is a brief pro forma analysis comparing the MSCI Provisional Index Series with the MSCI Standard Index Series for some of the more frequently used global and regional composite indices, using data as of May 11, 2001.
All Country World Index (ACWI) Free &8211; The MSCI ACWI Free Index SM represents 49 of the world’s developed and emerging equity markets. On a pro forma basis, the overall free float-adjusted market capitalization of the MSCI Provisional ACWI Free Index (USD 18,171 billion) will be lower than the total market capitalization of the MSCI Standard ACWI Free Index (USD 18,764 billion). This is the net result of the decrease in market capitalization due to the free float adjustment of the constituents in the Provisional
ACWI Free Index which are also in the Standard ACWI Free Index, and the increase in market capitalization resulting from securities that will be included in the Provisional ACWI Free Index but are not in the Standard ACWI Free Index. The Provisional ACWI Free Index will contain 2,258 securities vs. 2,066 in the Standard
ACWI Free Index.
On a pro forma basis, the USA and the United Kingdom Indices will have the largest increases in country weights. In the Provisional ACWI Free Index, the weight of the USA Index will be 55.3% as compared with 49.1% in the Standard ACWI Free Index, while the weight of the United Kingdom Index will be 10.4% as compared with 9.3%. Conversely, the largest decreases in country weights will occur in the Japan, France and Germany Indices (-1.3, -1.2 and -1.0 percentage points, respectively).
The industry groups with the greatest weight differences on a pro forma basis are Technology Hardware & Equipment and Telecommunication Services, which will have weights of 11.5% and 7.2% in the Provisional ACWI Free Index as compared with 10.0% and 8.2% in the Standard ACWI Free Index, respectively. The higher weight of the Technology Hardware & Equipment industry group is mainly due to securities that will be included in the Provisional ACWI Free Index, but are not in the Standard ACWI Free Index. The lower weight of the Telecommunication Services industry group in the Provisional ACWI Free Index is primarily due to several large telecommunication companies in developed markets having lower average free float than companies in other industry groups.
On a pro forma basis, the weight of developed markets in the Provisional ACWI Free Index will be 96.9% as compared with 95.0% in the Standard ACWI Free Index. The weight of emerging markets in the Provisional ACWI Free Index will be 3.1% as compared with 5.0% in the Standard ACWI Free Index. The greater relative weight of developed markets in the Provisional ACWI Free Index is primarily due to the higher average free float, less restrictive foreign ownership limits and a greater availability of sizeable and liquid securities in developed markets vs. emerging markets.
EAFE (Europe, Australasia, Far East) Index &8211; The MSCI EAFE ® Index represents 21 developed equity markets outside of North America. On a pro forma basis, the overall free float-adjusted market capitalization of the MSCI Provisional EAFE Index (USD 7,195 billion) will be lower than the total market capitalization of the MSCI Standard EAFE Index (USD 8,230 billion). This is due primarily to free float-adjusting the market
capitalization of the constituents in the MSCI Provisional EAFE Index.
The United Kingdom Index will have the largest increase in country weight on a pro forma basis, increasing to 26.2% in the Provisional EAFE Index as compared with 21.2% in the Standard EAFE Index. The largest decreases in country weights in the Provisional EAFE Index as compared with the Standard EAFE Index will occur in the France, Germany and Italy Indices. The weight of the France Index will be 9.5% as compared with 11.2%, the weight of the Germany Index will be 7.0% as compared with 8.5%, and the weight of the Italy Index will be 3.7% as compared with 4.6%.
Emerging Markets Free (EMF) Index &8211; The MSCI EMF Index SM represents 26 of the world’s emerging equity markets. On a pro forma basis, the overall free float-adjusted market capitalization of the MSCI Provisional EMF Index (USD 562 billion) will be lower than the total market capitalization of the MSCI Standard EMF Index (USD 947 billion) primarily due to free float-adjusting the constituents in the MSCI Provisional EMF Index.
The South Africa and Korea Indices will have the largest increases in country weights on a pro forma basis. The weight of the South Africa Index will be 15.3% in the Provisional EMF Index as compared with 11.0% in the Standard EMF Index. The weight of the Korea Index will be 14.8% in the Provisional EMF Index as compared with 11.5% in the Standard EMF Index. The largest decreases in weights in the Provisional EMF
Index will be in the India, Mexico and Malaysia Indices. See the attachment for further details. After the application of a Limited Investability Factor, which accounts for restrictions on foreign equity investment other than those imposed by free float and foreign ownership limits, the Taiwan Index will have approximately the same weight in the Provisional EMF Index as it does in the Standard EMF Index.
Index Turnover &8211; If the Enhanced Methodology were immediately implemented in the MSCI Standard Indices listed below, the following one-way index turnover would result, based on pro forma data as of May 11, 2001:
Index One-Way Index Turnover
MSCI ACWI Free 14%
MSCI World 13%
MSCI EAFE 15%
MSCI EMF 23%
The MSCI World Index SM represents 23 of the world’s developed
equity markets.
Attached is a pro forma analysis comparing the country weights of the MSCI Provisional ACWI Free Index with the country weights of the MSCI Standard ACWI Free Index. In addition, attached are the top country and industry group weight increases and decreases for the MSCI Provisional ACWI Free, World, EAFE and EMF Indices as compared with the corresponding MSCI Standard Indices.
Note: All pro forma information uses data as of May 11, 2001.
(표) COMPARISON OF THE MSCI PROVISIONAL ACWI FREE INDEX WITH THE MSCI
STANDARD ACWI FREE INDEX BY COUNTRY
MSCI Provisional ACWI MSCI Standard ACWI Weight Difference
Free Index Weight Free Index Weight (Percentage Points)
Developed Markets
NORTH AMERICA
USA 55.30% 49.06% +6.24
Canada 2.02% 2.03% -0.02
Developed Markets
EUROPE
United Kingdom 10.38% 9.31% +1.06
France 3.77% 4.94% -1.16
Switzerland 2.87% 2.93% -0.05
Germany 2.76% 3.71% -0.95
Netherlands 2.17% 2.42% -0.25
Italy 1.47% 2.02% -0.55
Spain 1.23% 1.39% -0.16
Finland 1.00% 0.98% +0.02
Sweden 0.84% 1.00% -0.16
Ireland 0.34% 0.30% +0.04
Belgium 0.28% 0.39% -0.11
Denmark 0.28% 0.40% -0.12
Greece 0.16% 0.16% +0.00
Norway 0.16% 0.20% -0.04
Portugal 0.15% 0.23% -0.08
Austria 0.04% 0.09% -0.04
Developed Markets
ASIA PACIFIC
Japan 9.38% 10.71% -1.33
Australia 1.33% 1.32% +0.01
Hong Kong 0.66% 0.93% -0.27
Singapore 0.26% 0.38% -0.11
New Zealand 0.04% 0.05% -0.01
Emerging Markets
LATIN AMERICA
Brazil 0.30% 0.49% -0.19
Mexico 0.30% 0.59% -0.29
Chile 0.07% 0.18% -0.11
Argentina 0.03% 0.08% -0.04
Peru 0.01% 0.02% -0.01
Venezuela 0.01% 0.02% -0.02
Colombia 0.00% 0.01% -0.01
Emerging Markets
EMEA
South Africa 0.47% 0.56% -0.08
Israel 0.16% 0.24% -0.07
Russia 0.08% 0.14% -0.06
Turkey 0.05% 0.12% -0.07
Poland 0.04% 0.06% -0.02
Hungary 0.03% 0.04% -0.02
Egypt 0.01% 0.01% +0.00
Morocco 0.01% 0.01% +0.00
Czech Republic 0.01% 0.03% -0.02
Jordan 0.00% 0.01% -0.00
Emerging Markets
ASIA PACIFIC
Korea 0.46% 0.58% -0.12
Taiwan 0.44% 0.69% -0.24
China 0.26% 0.35% -0.08
Malaysia 0.12% 0.29% -0.17
India 0.12% 0.35% -0.23
Thailand 0.04% 0.08% -0.05
Philippines 0.02% 0.05% -0.02
Indonesia 0.02% 0.03% -0.02
Pakistan 0.00% 0.01% -0.01
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
Note: All pro forma information uses data as of May 11, 2001 and reflect the quarterly index rebalancing of the MSCI Standard Index Series announced on May 17, 2001, effective as of the close of May 31, 2001.
(표)COMPARISON OF MSCI PROVISIONAL INDEX WITH THE CORRESPONDING MSCI
STANDARD INDEX
MSCI ACWI FREE INDEX
Top Country Weight Weight Top Industry Weight
Increases Differenc Group Difference
USA 6.24% Technology Hardware 1.48%
& Equipment
United Kingdom 1.06% Diversified Financials 0.84%
Ireland 0.04% Energy 0.70%
Finland 0.02% Health Care Equipment 0.26%
& Services
Australia 0.01% Pharmaceuticals 0.23%
& Biotechnology
Top Country Weight Decreases Top Industry Group Weight Decreases
Japan -1.33% Telecommunication -1.04%
Services
France -1.16% Automobiles -0.50%
& Components
Germany -0.95% Banks -0.42%
Italy -0.55% Materials -0.32%
Mexico -0.29% Consumer Durables -0.30%
& Apparel
MSCI WORLD INDEX
Top Country Weight Weight Top Industry Weight
Increases Differenc Group Difference
USA 5.40% Technology Hardware 1.50%
& Equipment
United Kingdom 0.90% Diversified Financials 0.79%
Ireland 0.03% Energy 0.71%
- - Health Care Equipment 0.24%
& Services
- - Commercial Services 0.16%
& Supplies
Top Country Weight Decreases Top Industry Group Weight Decreases
Japan -1.60% Telecommunication -0.87%
Services
France -1.31% Automobiles -0.54%
& Components
Germany -1.06% Banks -0.35%
Italy -0.61% Consumer Durables -0.34%
& Apparel
Netherlands -0.31% Insurance -0.32%
MSCI EAFE INDEX
Top Country Weight Weight Top Industry Weight
Increases Differenc Group Difference
United Kingdom 4.98% Energy 1.54%
Switzerland 0.58% Technology Hardware 0.72%
& Equipment
Australia 0.36% Materials 0.43%
Finland 0.29% Pharmaceuticals 0.39%
& Biotechnology
Ireland 0.17% Software & Services 0.23%
Top Country Weight Decreases Top Industry Group Weight Decreases
France -1.73% Telecommunication -1.00%
Services
Germany -1.49% Capital Goods -0.76%
Italy -0.89% Automobiles -0.75%
& Components
Japan -0.73% Insurance -0.46%
Hong Kong -0.46% Banks -0.35%
MSCI EMF INDEX
Top Country Weight Weight Top Industry Weigh
Increases Differenc Group Difference
South Africa 4.33% Technology Hardware 2.65%
& Equipment
Korea 3.27% Insurance 1.28%
China 1.65% Energy 1.00%
Taiwan 0.73% Software & Services 0.66%
Israel 0.59% Diversified Financials0.59%
Top Country Weight Decreases Top Industry Group Weight Decreases
India -3.01% Food Beverage -1.53%
& Tobacco
Mexico -2.00% Utilities -1.47%
Malaysia -1.79% Capital Goods -0.91%
Chile -1.37% Banks -0.79%
Turkey -0.66% Telecommunication -0.69%
Services
Note: All pro forma information uses data as of May 11, 2001.
This information is the property of Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI). It is provided for informational purposes only, and is not a recommendation to
participate in any particular trading strategy. This information may not be used to verify or correct data, or any compilation of data or index or in the creation of any
indices. Nor may it be used in the writing, creating, marketing or promotion of any financial instruments or products. This information is provided on an “as is”
basis. Neither MSCI, its affiliates nor any other party involved in the making or compiling of this information makes any representation or warranty, express or
implied, as to the results to be obtained by any person or entity from any use of this information, and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use
made of this information. Neither MSCI, its affiliates nor any other party involved in the making or compiling of the information makes any express or implied
warranties, and MSCI, its affiliates and any such third party hereby expressly disclaim all warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose with respect to any of this information. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall MSCI, its affiliates or any other party
involved in the making or compiling of this information have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or any other damages (including lost
profits) even if notified of the possibility of such damages.
Morgan Stanley Capital International, MSCI, ACWI, EAFE, EMF and all other service marks referred to herein are the exclusive property of MSCI and its affiliates.
All MSCI indices are the exclusive property of MSCI and may not be used in any way without the express permission of MSCI.
- (300조를 움직이는 사람들)⑨박성진 삼성투신 차장(중)
- [edaily] 이번주 “300조를 움직이는 사람들”은 삼성투신운용의 스트레티지스트인 박성진 차장입니다. (인터뷰 상편에서 이어짐)
<운명의 장난(?) 교수의 꿈이 증권사 채권맨으로>
-그럼 신영증권에 입사한 것은 어떤 계기에서입니까.
▲아까 말씀드렸듯이 유학을 가려고 했는데요. 제가 준비했던 학교가 인디애나 주립대였어요. 미국 내에서도 빅 10에 들어가고 무엇보다도 한국학자들 중 여기서 학위받은 분들이 많은 곳이죠.
제 석사논문을 영어로 번역해서 원서를 넣었더니 그 쪽에서 “좋다. 너는 바로 박사과정에 진학해도 된다”고 하더군요. 이게 왠 떡이냐 싶었죠. 돈도 없는데 미국에서 다시 석사부터 시작하려면 좀 시간이 많이 걸리겠습니까.
의기양양 비자를 받으러 대사관에 갔더니 아까 그 여자 면접관이 “your job responsibility is not enough guarantee to come back. Your financial status is not enough guarantee to finish your coursework” 이라고 하더군요. 기가 막혔죠. 그때가 12월이었어요. 1월에 미국으로 가서 2월부터 시작하는 강의를 수강해야 하는데 말입니다. 저는 그 때 이미 결혼을 해서 기혼자용 기숙사에 제 피 같은 돈 100불을 예치금으로 송금까지 한 상황이었어요.
눈앞이 캄캄해졌습니다. 그래서 사정을 했죠. 그런데 전혀 안 통해요. 안 통하는 정도가 아니라 전경을 불러서 끌어낼 태세에요. 하늘이 노래진다는 것 느껴본 적 있으십니까. 한 남자의 꿈과 인생이 일개 미 대사관 직원의 손에서 박살이 난 겁니다.
인디애나 주립대에 전화를 했습니다. 창피해서 비자가 리젝트됐다는 소리는 죽어도 못하겠고 개인적인 사정이 생겨서 다음 달에는 못 가겠다고 말했어요. 그랬더니 “괜찮다. 2년 안으로만 다시 하면 된다. 그렇지만 2년이 지나면 토플과 GRE를 새로 시험 봐서 최신 성적을 보내주면 또 된다”고 친절히 알려주더군요.
그래서 낙담한 마음을 조금은 지울 수 있었죠. 그 때 병도 좀 앓았는데 가장이니 어떡합니까. 먹고는 살아아죠. 신문을 탁 펼치고 구인광고를 막 뒤졌어요.
취직을 하기로 결심하고 보니 12월에 신입사원을 뽑는 곳이 딱 두 군데였어요. 신영증권이랑 디지털조선. 처음에는 당연히 디지털조선에 가고 싶었습니다. 대기업공채는 이미 가을에 끝났고 신영증권은 회사 자체에 일이 있어서 12월로 늦춰졌다고 하더군요. 신영증권의 일정이 먼저 시작됐는데 모집분야에 연구/조사 분야가 있었어요. 일단 두 곳에 모두 원서를 넣었죠.
-증권이 무엇인지는 아는 상태에서 입사를 결정한 것은 아닐텐데요.
▲그런 건 아닙니다. 사실… 유학준비를 하면서 잠깐 토플학원 강사로 일했는데 그 학원 바로 옆에 동서증권이 있었어요. 학원에서는 초급반 영어랑 주부회화를 담당했습니다. 아침에만 좀 바쁘고 오후에는 내리 놀아요. 그리고 학생들 수업끝나고 직장인들 하루 일과가 끝나는 저녁시간에 연이어 수업이 계속되는 거죠. 학원강사가 참 고달픈 직업입니다. 건강도 많이 망쳐요.
낮에 시간 많겠다 바로 옆에 증권회사 있겠다. 그래서 순진한 집사람을 꾀서 주식을 하겠다고 졸랐어요. 당시 집사람이 피아노 레슨을 20개나 해서 2000만원을 모았거든요. 그 돈으로 주식투자를 시작했습니다.
이 돈을 불려서 유학가자는 결심을 하고 증권계좌를 만들었더니 처음에는 잘 되더라구요. 금방 2500만원으로 돈이 불어났거든요. 저는 주식의 ‘주’자도 몰랐고 기업에 대해서도 전혀 아는 바가 없었어요.
들어본 회사라고는 아버님이 다니셨던 동아건설이 고작이었어요. 당시 성수대교 붕괴사태 때문에 동아건설주가 무척 쌌어요. 그래서 “음 저건 낙폭과대주야” 라고 매입했죠. 하하. 그리고 당시 금성이라는 이름을 가진 LG계열사 주식도 샀고요. 그런데 첫끗발이 개끗발이라고 그 다음부터는 폭락하기 시작하는 겁니다.(웃음)
그 후 손절할 때가 왔는데도 그걸 못했어요. 개미투자자의 전형적인 실패사례죠. ‘손절하지 않고 기다리면 언젠가는 오를거야’ 라는 말도 안되는 류의 생각들. 되긴 뭐가 됩니까. 유학 갈 날짜는 다가오고 점점 돈은 줄어드는 지경이 됐어요. 대충 정리를 해보니까 1500만원이 조금 안되는 돈이 남았더군요. 속으로는 “그래도 선방했다. 이게 다 내가 블루칩과 낙폭과대주를 산 덕택이야” 라는 생각을 했습니다. 하하
유학이 취소되고 나니까 오기가 생기더라구요. 내가 왜 주식투자에 실패했는지 증권회사에 들어가서 몸소 알아봐야겠다는 오기죠. 전 그 당시만해도 증권회사 직원들은 그 이유를 다 알고 있다고 생각했어요. 제 딴에는 인생의 막다른 골목에 몰렸는데 그 길밖에는 방법이 없다고 믿었습니다.
디지털조선은 어떻게 됐냐구요? 제가 학부는 놀아서 학점이 나쁜데 대학원은 all A였어요. 대학원 all A지, 토플 점수 우수하지…나름대로는 서류는 문제없다고 생각하고 디조에 원서를 보냈어요. 그런데 서류에서 떨어졌습니다.(웃음) 그래서 지금도 조선일보는 감정이 좋지 않아요.
<우연의 연속, 채권분석가가 되기까지>
-신영증권에 들어자마자 바로 채권부로 갔습니까?
▲연수를 받고 신입사원들에게 지원부서를 적으라더군요. 1순위는 무조건 조사부 적었죠. 한 게 그것 밖에 없으니까요. 그리고 두번째는 국제부. 폼 나잖아요. 3순위. 주식부. 왜 주식을 하다가 망했는지 알고 싶어서였습니다. 그런데 발령을 하는데 인사부장이 “박성진 채권부” 하고 부르는 겁니다.
인상 팍 쓰면서 ‘도대체 채권부가 뭐하는데야?’ 라고 생각했어요. 인사부장께 물었죠. 채권부가 뭐하는 곳이냐고. 그랬더니 인사부장이 “아파트 분양하잖아. 거기서 채권받거든. 분양하고 나오는 사람들 앞에서 채권, 채권 하면서 소리지르고 가서 팔아. 너 명동이나 주택가에서 채권, 채권하면서 팔러다니는 사람들 본 적 없냐? 그거하는 거야” 라고 말했습니다.
정말 토씨하나 다르지않게 전해드리는 거에요. 반은 농담이라고 생각했지만 정말 황당했어요.(웃음) 채권이 뭔지도 몰랐고 관심도 없었던 데다 신입사원 교육 때 채권시간이 무지 재미없었거든요. 수학공식 막 쓰고 계산도 복잡하고.
채권부에 갔더니 지금 LG투신에 있는 최원녕 과장이 “네가 채권부냐?” 라고 인상을 쓰면서 말하는 거에요. 그런데 알고 보니까 초등학교 선배더라구요. 그것 때문에 꽉 잡혀서 찍 소리도 못하고 살았죠. 하하.
-결국 전공이나 희망사항과는 전혀 상관없이 채권판에 들어왔군요. 처음에는 무슨 일을 했습니까.
▲수도결제죠뭐.(증권사가 채권매매 중개시 현물 채권과 대금을 교환, 결제해주는 것) 처음 증권사 채권부에 가면 하는 일이 그거 밖에 더 있겠습니까. 속된 말로 인생이 완전히 골로 가더라구요. 그전까지는 알튀세르, 레비스트로스와 라캉을 논하던 나름대로 먹물먹은 지식인이라고 제 딴에 자부했는데 말이죠. 하하. 인생이 이렇게 꼬이고 저렇게 꼬이는데 정신을 못 차리겠더군요. 그냥 전공살려서 기자나 됐으면 폼이라도 날 거 아니겠어요. (웃음)
-수도는 얼마나 했습니까?
▲9개월 정도? 한 일년 가까이 했습니다. 제가 신입사원 동기들보다 나이가 좀 많았어요. 다행인 것은 저랑 한 조가 된 친구가 운전을 전혀 할 줄 몰랐어요. 그래서 제가 운전을 하고 그 친구가 막 뛰어다니는 일을 했죠(웃음) 제가 어떤 건물 앞에 차를 탁 세우면 그 친구는 미친 듯 뛰어올라가서 도장 찍어오고. 수도를 직접 해 봐야 채권의 비애를 몸소 체험할 수 있어요. 길이 막힐 때는 원효대교를 뛰어서 여의도로 들어오기도 했습니다.
재미있는 일화가 많았어요. 그때 거래가 많았거든요. 선배들이 “야 이 자식아 빨리빨리 처리 못해? 느려터져 가지고선” 뭐 이렇게 혼이났죠. 저도 열이 받으면 “우리 회사에서 매매보고서 나보다 더 빨리 작성하는 사람있으면 나와보라 그래. 나보다 더 빨리 하는 사람없으니까 늦는다고 갈구지 마” (웃음) 이렇게 맞받았죠.
<“너는 컴퓨터도 잘 다루니까 기술적 분석이나 한번 해봐라”>
-채권의 기술적 분석을 시작한 건 언제인가요.
▲그것도 제가 하겠다고 한 게 아니라 신영증권 황 부장께서 “너는 컴퓨터도 잘 다루니까 이거 한번 해봐라” 이런 식으로 명령을 내리셔서 하게 된 겁니다. 입사하고 3개월 후부터 수도업무랑 채권분석을 같이하기 시작했어요. 채권단가, 이론부터 알아나갔죠. 실제로 해보니까 제가 한 것이 잘 맞아 떨어지더라구요. 잘 맞을 때까지 조정도 이리저리 해보고. 여하튼 재미있었습니다.
-채권관련 책은 몇 종류나 봤습니까.
▲기술적 분석에 관한 책은 사실 그다지 많지 않아요. 거기에 나오는 공식들을 보는거죠.
제가 좀 컴퓨터를 다루니까 그 공식들을 프로그램으로 짜고 그것을 또다시 엑셀에서 구현하는 작업들을 했어요. 조정과정을 몇 개월 거치니까 신기할 정도로 잘 맞는 거에요. 그때 당시에는 족집게처럼 들어맞는다고 느껴졌을 정도니까요.
-그게 몇 년도인가요.
▲입사하던 해였으니까 96년이군요. 그런데 이유가 있더라구요. 그 당시 시장은 지금처럼 시가평가(market to market) 시장도 아니었고 대부분 시장참가자들이 기관투자가다 보니까 현재에 비해 모멘텀이 훨씬 분명한 시장이었습니다.
지금처럼 변동성이 큰 것이 아니라 한 번 모멘텀이 생기면 관성에 의해서 일정 기간은 그것이 계속 유지가 된 거죠. 단기 딜링을 해서 돈도 벌 수 있을 것 같고 자신감도 막 생겨났습니다. 아침회의에서 “금리 어떻게 될 것 같나?” 라는 질문을 받을 때 신입사원임에도 불구하고 코멘트를 하고. 그러면서 “아 나는 이쪽 방면에 소질이 있는가봐. 분석의 천재라니까” 라는 착각에 빠지게됐죠(웃음).
그 시절에는 어디 인터넷이 있습니까. 나오는 모든 금융데이타를 일일이 손으로 작업했어요. 한국은행 데이터, 경기동향, 통계청 데이터를 수기로 입력했다는 거 아닙니까. 아주 초보적인 수준이었지만 재미있었어요.
-재미를 느낀 것이 가장 큰 이유였군요. 그만두겠다는 생각도 안하고 말입니다.
▲물론 처음에는 번듯한 직장에 취직해 비자받을 때 흠 잡히지 않고 돈 모아서 곧 유학을 떠날 계획이었습니다.(웃음) 학원강사랑은 엄청난 차이가 있잖아요. 증권회사라면 미국사람들도 job responsibility가 어쩌니 저쩌니 못할 거 아니겠어요. 2년간 괜찮다는데 금방 떠나려고 했죠. 그런데 학위받는 일에 대해서 회의가 들기 시작했어요. 유학 갈 형편도 안됐지만. 사실 우리나라에서 학계만큼 정치적인 곳도 없잖아요.
물론 하고 싶은 일을 못했다는 것에 대한 자괴감이 없을 수는 없죠. 사람인데. 수도하면서 도장받으러 다니려고 내가 이때까지 공부했나. 이런 생각들. 그래서 대학때부터 다니던 교회에도 뜸하게 되고. 저는 토요일 교회모임 때문에 대학시절 내내 그 흔한 MT도 한번 안 간 사람인데 말이에요.
‘이렇게 열심히 살면서 하나님을 모셨는데 생 양아치 같은 애들은 다 잘되고 나는 남들 다 가는 유학 한 번 못 가나’속으로는 그런 생각을 해도 위에서 뭐하라고 시키면 죽어라 하거든요.(웃음) 제가 바로 그랬어요. 마음 속은 썩어 문드러져도 하라면 다 했으니까요.
그러다 지금 다니는 교회 목사님을 만났어요. 그 목사님께서 “하나님이 자네를 유학 보내시지 않은 이유가 있다. 이 세상에서 지금 자네가 해야 할 일이 있다. 지금 그 일을 시키시려고 일부러 여기 남게 하신 거다. 하나님은 당신에게 시장을 분석하고 예측하는 일에 관한 재능을 주신거다. 네가 경제학을 공부하지는 않았지만 그 부분은 하나님이 메꿔 주실거다.” 이렇게 설득을 하시더군요.
-조직 안에서 전문적으로 분석을 시작한 건 언제인가요.
▲수도일이 끝나고 나서는 상품운용팀에 들어갔어요. 말이 상품운용이지 일반고객들을 상대로 채권을 파는 거였죠. 전자계산기도 무지 잘 써야했구요. 세금계산을 손으로 하는데 나중에는 손이 보이지않을 정도로 손동작을 놀려야 했습니다.
-아니 엑셀이 있었을텐데 왜 그런 일을 했습니까.
▲관행이라는 것이 그렇게 쉽게 깨지는 것이 아네요(웃음). 엑셀쓰자고 어른들에게 건의하면 무조건 손으로도 할 줄 알아야 된대요. 컴퓨터 없을 때는 네가 어떡할거냐는 거죠.
<”상상력과 재치” 시황으로 이름을 얻다>
-그럼 시황을 본격적으로 쓴 건 언제입니까.
▲브로커팀으로 옮기면서 시황을 쓰게 됐습니다. IMF 외환위기가 터지기 3개월 정도 전이었어요. 97년 9월로 기억합니다. 그 당시 데일리 한편 조그만 귀퉁이에다가 제 이름으로 시황을 쓰기 시작했어요. 그런데 평이 너무 좋은 거에요. (웃음)
-제 기억으로도 호평을 받았던 것이 생각나네요. 기술적 분석과 관련된 코멘트도 최초로 나왔었죠 아마? 지금도 그 얘기를 하는 분들이 있는데.
▲아까도 말씀드렸지만 자체 제작한 툴을 가지고 하니까 제 예측이 잘 맞으니까 ‘이걸 다른 사람들에게도 알려주자’ 라는 마음에서 시작하게 됐어요. 나름대로 제가 생각한 아이디어도 많이 넣었죠. 확인도 안 해보고 “이런 건 아닐까? 저런 건 아닐까?” 를 집어넣은 겁니다. 그때는 그게 장점이었죠. 지금은 단점이 됐지만(웃음)
제가 지금도 “너는 확인해보면 간단한 일을 가지고 상상을 먼저 해. 그래서 안돼” 질책을 받아요. 그러면서 맨날 깨지거든요. 하지만 그 때 당시에는 그것이 재미있다고 받아들여졌다고 생각해요.
-당시 데일리 말고 따로 리포트를 쓴 적은 없나요.
▲사실 저는 데일리를 쓸 만한 내공도 가지지 못했어요. 지금도 그렇구요. 배우는 과정에 있다고 생각합니다. 채권을 잘 알지도 못하는 애가 채권계에 입문해서 뭔가 쓴다고 하니까 사람들이 관심을 가져준 정도겠죠. DB 만들고 상관관계 분석하는 모든 일들이 재미있었고 지금도 도움이 많이 됩니다.
-첫번째 프리젠테이션은 어디서 했습니까.
▲정말 기억이 안나요. 한때 많이 불려다니긴 했는데 어디서 처음 했는지가 기억이 잘 안 나는군요. 자주 갔던 곳은 외환, 한미은행 등 은행권이었습니다.
-혼자 갔습니까.
▲아뇨. 담당부장님과 함께 갔습니다. 가서 상담하고 이것저것 말해주고. 사실 맞았던 적보다 틀린 적이 훨씬 많았어요. 틀렸을 때의 그 창피함, 짜증남이라는 건 말로 못해요. 틀린 것만 가지고도 많은 공부를 할 수가 있었습니다. 그 당시만해도 채권 프리젠테이션을 하는 곳이 거의 없었어요. 다른 곳에서는 프리젠테이션을 한다고 전해주는 정보가 채권시장 안에 있는 사람들에겐 너무 빈약하게 느껴진거죠. 시장도 좁고 돌아가는 메커니즘도 빤한 곳이 이 바닥 아닙니까.
그런데 제가 가서 이러저러 말을 하니까 “쟤는 채권수도도 해 본 녀석이고 말은 좀 통하네” 라는 평가를 받았다고 생각합니다. 아는 건 절대 아네요. 전 지금도 투신, 은행권이 어떻게 채권을 사고 파는지 잘 몰라요. 많은 선배들은 제게 “네가 말은 참신하고 조리있게 했지만 실상 은행이나 보험이 그렇게 단순하게 자산운용을 하는 곳이 아니다” 라고 충고를 해줬죠.
-그 당시 가장 기억에 남는 건 뭡니까.
▲우리 시장이 좀 건조하다 보니..제가 장난기가 좀 심한 편이라 의도적으로 코믹하게 쓰려고 했어요. 그러면서도 내용의 본질은 놓치지않으려고 나름대로 애를 쓰긴 했는데. 별루 기억에 남는 것이 없네요.
-시황제목을 무척 재미있게 달았던 걸로 기억됩니다만.
▲음 그런 건 있었어요. 외환위기 이후 IMF 고금리 정책을 계속 고수했잖아요. 그 후 분기마다 정책 내용을 바꾸게 됐는데 한번은 영문을 읽어보니까 이번엔 고금리 정책 완화기조로 간다 뭐 이렇게 느껴지더라구요. 그리고 진짜 금리가 내렸습니다. 마침 금리가 하락하는 날 IMF 서울사무소장의 금리하락 멘트도 나갔죠. 그 시점에서 제가 뭐라고 코멘트를 했냐면 “IMF는 Immediate Money-market Fever 다“ 라고 했어요. 사람들이 그런 걸 기억해 준 거죠. 분석을 잘해서가 아니라.
(인터뷰 하편으로 이어짐)
- 뉴브리지, "제일은행 스톡옵션 적법절차 따른 것" (전문)
- [edaily]
...뉴브리지가 제일은행의 스톡옵션에 대해 국내 뉴스커뮤니케이션(홍보대행사)를 통해 밝힌 내용 전문.
Statement by Newbridge Capital Group
For immediate release
March 22, 2001
Summary
Newbridge Capital Group (“Newbridge”) categorically rejected today any claim, indication or implication of violation of law, regulation or rules by Korea First Bank (“KFB”) in connection with the issuance of stock options and it maintains that any claim, indication or implication to the contrary is incorrect and wholly without basis in fact. Newbridge, KFB and its board of directors have operated in strict compliance with relevant laws, regulations and rules governing banks in Korea and in accordance with international best practices.
The facts are clear:
· The transaction agreements between Newbridge and the Korean Government provide for the issuance of stock options for up to 5% of outstanding shares at the time of the bank"s acquisition.
· In March 2000, Korea First Bank"s board unanimously approved the grant of stock options to management in accordance with all Korean rules and regulations. In fact, KDIC and MOFE have 3 directors on KFB"s board. KFB made all required disclosures about these option grants.
· On the same day as this board meeting, and without prior notice, the Korean Government amended its regulations to require that share prices of any listed company not traded on the Korea Stock Exchange be established in accordance with Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”) rules.
· Over one year after such amendment, the FSC has not adopted pricing guidelines.
· In February 2001, KFB board, in connection with granting new options, unanimously passed a resolution specifically providing that the exercise price will be the higher of the amount specified by the board or the amount determined pursuant to FSC rules.
· In other words, the KFB board recognizes the civic responsibility of the FSC and has complied fully with its rules.
· KFB has communicated with the Financial Supervisory Service (“FSS”) requesting the rules and methodology for calculating the exercise price of stock options. It looks forward to receiving this information.
· Recruiting a strong management team and a reputable board are critical to the turnaround of KFB and management options are vital in attracting the best international talents. The granting of such stock options is also considered international best practice to properly incentivize management to grow KFB for the benefit of shareholders, including KDIC and MOFE, and the Korean public. For these reasons, Newbridge, KDIC and MOFE, all beneficiaries of increase in shareholder value, agreed to a management stock option plan as part of the transaction.
Full Body of Statement
There have been several recent reports in the press regarding the management stock option plan of KFB. Many of these reports contain incorrect and misleading information. Newbridge today emphasized that, since it has assumed control of KFB in January 2000, KFB and its board of directors have operated in complete and strict compliance with relevant laws, regulations and rules governing banks in Korea and in accordance with international best practices. Any claim, indication or implication to the contrary is incorrect and wholly without basis in fact. For the benefit of the public interest and record, set forth below is an accurate summary of the events surrounding the management stock option plan of KFB.
In line with international best practices, Newbridge, KDIC and MOFE agreed, as part of the acquisition of KFB, to establish a management stock option program. As specifically provided for in the transaction agreements, KFB is entitled to grant up to 5% of shares outstanding as of the closing of Newbridge’s investment as an incentive to management. In connection with the transaction, KDIC itself also received warrants, which are essentially the same as stock options, exercisable for a 10-year period for common stock of KFB equal to 5% of the shares outstanding at the closing.
The first option grants under the management stock option program were unanimously approved by the KFB board on March 15, 2000. The board included members appointed by KDIC and MOFE. Subsequently these grants were approved in a shareholders meeting. As stipulated by the Securities and Exchange Act requiring disclosure of all option grants of listed companies within one day of the relevant board resolution, KFB duly reported its actions to the FSS and the Korea Stock Exchange. No objections to, or inquiries about, these first option grants were received by KFB from KDIC or the FSC until February 2001 when the second option grants were approved by the KFB board.
On March 15, 2000, the very same day as the KFB board meeting at which the first option grants were approved, the MOFE Regulation promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act was amended. Given the timing, and the fact that it did not receive any advance notice of the proposed amendment, it was not possible for KFB to anticipate the promulgation of the new regulation. Under the amended Regulation, the exercise price of stock options for listed companies whose trading is suspended must not be less than the price determined by the FSC. Although the amendment established the general principle that pricing is to be based on the asset status, profitability and other factors of a company, despite the passage of a full year since the amendment, the FSC still has not issued detailed guidelines, such as the actual method for calculation of the exercise price. Nor has the FSC established any specific prices or detailed guidelines with regard to the pricing for the stock options issued by KFB.
The second management option grants were approved by the KFB board in February 2001. In compliance with the amended MOFE Regulation of the Securities and Exchange Act, the exercise price of the options was set at the higher of a price specified in the board resolution or the amount determined pursuant to the FSC guidelines, when available. Due to the continued absence of detailed guidelines and any specified method of calculation, the board is not able to determine the exercise price established by the FSC regulations. KFB therefore believes it has acted responsibly in this matter to comply with the current regulations and intends to fully comply with the detailed guidelines once they are established. KFB has already consulted with the FSS on this matter and, since more than one year has already passed since the amendment of the MOFE Regulation, Newbridge hopes that the FSC will adopt the required detailed guidelines without further delay for the benefit of all banks in the same situation as KFB.
Contact:
Weijian Shan
Managing Director, Newbridge Capital Group
Member, Board of Directors, Korea First Bank
Telephone: 852-2523-5000
Fax: 852-2530-9948
- FRB, 금리 0.5%포인트 인하
- [edaily] 미국의 연방준비제도이사회는 20일 공개시장위원회에서 연방기금금리(은행간 오버나이트 대출금리)를 현재의 5.5%에서 5.0%로 0.5%포인트 인하한다고 발표했다. 이는 금융시장의 0.75%포인트 인하 기대에 못미치는 수준이어서 한때 뉴욕증시에서 주가가 급락세를 보이다가 곧바로 반등했다.
연준은 회의 결과 발표문에서 "주가하락으로 인해 소비가 줄어들고 기업들의 마진율이 낮아지면서 투자지출도 감소하고 있기 때문에 금리를 0.5%포인트 인하한다"고 밝혔다. 이로써 연준은 올들어서만 금리를 1.5%포인트 인하했다.
이같은 인하폭은 금융시장에서의 기대치에 못미치는 수준이어서 회의결과 발표직후 뉴욕증시의 3대 주가지수는 급락세를 보였으나 다시 곧바로 반등, 오히려 오름세를 보이고 있다. 조만간 금리를 추가로 인하할 것이라는 기대감 때문으로 풀이된다.
오후 2시 30분 현재 나스닥지수는 어제보다 16.50포인트, 0.85% 오른 1967.68포인트를 기록하고 있고 다우존스지수도 어제보다 54.19포인트, 0.54% 상승한 10013.30포인트를 기록중이다. S&P500지수 역시 어제보다 0.65% 오른 상태다.
* 다음은 연준이 발표한 회의결과 원문이다.
For immediate release
The Federal Open Market Committee at its meeting today decided to lower its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 5 percent. In a related action, the Board of Governors approved a 50 basis point reduction in the discount rate to 4-1/2 percent.
Persistent pressures on profit margins are restraining investment spending and, through declines in equity wealth, consumption. The associated backup in inventories has induced a rapid response in manufacturing output and, with spending having firmed a bit since last year, inventory adjustment appears to be well underway.
Although current developments do not appear to have materially diminished the prospects for long-term growth in productivity, excess productive capacity has emerged recently. The possibility that this excess could continue for some time and the potential for weakness in global economic conditions suggest substantial risks that demand and production could remain soft. In these circumstances, when the economic situation could be evolving rapidly, the Federal Reserve will need to monitor developments closely.
The Committee continues to believe that against the background of its long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth and of the information currently available, the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.
In taking the discount rate action, the Federal Reserve Board approved requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of all twelve Reserve Banks
